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ABSTRACT 
 
MEDICAL DEVICE ALARM SYSTEMS:  A MULTI-HOSPITAL STUDY 
OF ALARM-RELATED EVENTS, CAREGIVER ALARM RESPONSE, 
AND THEIR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
 
by 
 
Colleen Lindell 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the Supervision of Professor Derek Nazareth 
 
Medical device alarm systems are expected to improve patient care by alerting clinicians about 
conditions that require attention.  However, due to a variety of circumstances, including 
inadequate training, muting alarms, alarm fatigue, and staffing shortages, the effectiveness of 
alarm systems may be questionable.  This research looked at the appropriateness of time- to-
respond (TTR) to alarms, the alarm system configuration, policies and procedures regarding 
alarms, and the extent of alarm-specific training and education alarms.  Using concepts from 
cognitive systems engineering, organization policy, and organizational learning, a research 
model was assembled to investigate these relationships.   
Quantitative data analysis included an online survey conducted in four hospitals, retrospective 
review of alarm data related to patient harms, review of Nurse Call download data used to 
compare self-report of alarms to actual numbers of alarms as well as to assist in answering 
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exploratory questions.  Qualitative data analysis included the clinician survey comments, review 
of alarm-related policy and procedure, and staff interviews.   
Alarm survey data were collected from a total of 107 respondents over a three-month 
timeframe.  Data download of alarms totaled 88,307.  Using a logistic regression approach, 
partial support for the hypotheses was found across contexts of high, medium, and low priority 
alarms.  The overall prediction of appropriateness of alarm response was good, except in the 
case of medium priority alarms.  Examination of the alarm data revealed that clinician response 
to medium priority alarms was considerably slower than anticipated.   
The results indicated that alarm configuration, policy, education, and training provided some 
explanation about alarm response.  However, resulting data also indicated that the relationship 
between the alarm priorities and response times are not fully understood.  While high priority 
and low priority alarms were approached appropriately, medium priority alarms did not elicit 
the same response.  This is of some concern given that they form the bulk of the alarms in some 
hospitals.  While alarm configuration, policy and procedures, education and training provided 
some explanation about alarm response, other factors may contribute to the disparity in 
response which were not clarified in this research.  As more devices with alarm capabilities are 
introduced into patient care, it is imperative that the appropriate response is elicited in 
clinicians.  
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
 
Alarm source:  
Medical devices such as Nurse Call systems, Physiologic monitors, Infusion pumps, Ventilators 
or other devices as noted in Table 1. 
Configuration:   
The alarms are customized and configurable based on alarm type, priority, staff assignments, 
and escalation path (based on availability and timers or delays and can be latched or un-
latched). 
Middleware:   
Systems or “engines” that reside between the alarm source and an end-device such as 
telephones (VoIP), pager, or communication badge.  The middleware collects alarms from the 
source and distributes to the end device(s).   
RT: 
Response time. 
Time-to-respond (TTR):   
The time elapsed from when the alarm was triggered at the bedside to when the alarm 
returned to normal state. 
TJC: 
The Joint Commission 
 
xiii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First and foremost, I want to thank my professors and advisors, Derek Nazareth and Hemant 
Jain for recognizing my potential to make a strong contribution to the field of medical device 
integration studies.  I want to further thank my committee members for their scholarly and 
professional review, support and continued encouragement.  I will be forever grateful:  
 
Dr. Derek Nazareth 
Dr. Hemant Jain 
Dr. Christine R. Kovach 
Dr. Mark D Srite 
Dr. Hyunkyoung Oh 
Dr. Jasmin Flores 
  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the criticality of medical devices and their corresponding alarms, 
discusses number and type of alarming medical devices, the under-reporting of patient alarm-
related events, and the complexities and trepidations of technology advancements which 
ultimately impact patient outcomes.   
In 1994, Dr. Lucian L. Leape opened a medicine Pandora's Box with his 1994 JAMA paper, “Error 
in Medicine”.   He made the bold statement that only 5-20% of medical errors were being 
reported and that medical mistakes accounted for approximately 180,000 deaths annually 
(Leape 1994).  In his 2009 “Death by Medicine” paper, Null cites “a study conducted in two 
obstetrical units in the UK which found that only about one-quarter of adverse incidents were 
ever reported.  Reasons for failing to report include: to protect staff, to preserve reputations, or 
for fear of reprisals, including lawsuits. An analysis found that only 1.5% of all adverse events 
result in an incident report, and only 6% of adverse drug events are identified properly. If 
hospitals admitted to the actual number of errors for which they are responsible, which is 
about 20 times what is reported, they would come under intense scrutiny (Null, 2009).” 
The under-reporting of medical errors is no surprise to most caregivers.   Caregivers want 
employment security, fear legal complications and believe that most medical errors do not 
cause patient injury or death.   The number of medical errors that are determined to be the 
cause of death is underreported (TJC 2013).  However, the impact on the patient’s family, can 
be immense.  In addition, there are serious ethical, social, and legal implications. 
In 2014, an Ohio woman having elective surgery on her wrist experienced a sentinel event in 
the Operating Room and filed a malpractice lawsuit blaming the anesthesiologist for being 
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“distracted” as well as for “alarm fatigue” for an unnoticed premature release of an upper arm 
tourniquet which resulted in a bolus dose of Lidocaine into her system causing respiratory 
arrest.  While the alarms on the blood pressure monitor, pulse oximeter and EKG were being 
triggered, they did not sound.  Most likely, the alarming devices were silenced by the end user 
of the device.  What was to be outpatient same-day surgery, ended up being a 23-day hospital 
stay and left her with on-going memory and speech deficits (Burger, 2014).   
Medical devices are used for the purposes of diagnosing, monitoring, treating, or alleviating 
disease to support or sustain life.  As medical devices grow increasingly complex, particularly 
with the addition of software and new “safety” features such as increased notifications and 
integration of systems, the ability of caregivers to respond promptly and appropriately to the 
medical device alarms are affected.  Research has found medical device alarm issues to be 
universal, ongoing, and problematic (Lindell, 2014).  Alarm anxieties are a patient safety issue 
requiring greater clarity to optimize the use and value of medical device systems interactions 
intended to support or sustain life.  Clinical alarms warn caregivers of potential hazards and can 
be instrumental in preventing patient injury or death.  Medical device alarm conditions must be 
quickly and consistently conveyed.  A critical clinical alarm is any audible or visual indication  
from a system or device, that when activated, may result in injury or death without immediate 
clinical intervention. Thus, particularly with critical clinical alarms, if the alarm indications aren’t 
effectively communicated, patients are at risk.  Medical device alarms also warn caregivers of 
hazards and can be instrumental in preventing patient injury or death.  However, there are 
continued issues associated with clinical alarm systems (Block 1999, Korniewicz 2008, Valentin 
2006). 
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Due to the increasing number of alarming devices being placed on patients and the integration 
of these systems as one means to adapt, it is important that we fully understand the number 
and type of medical devices, how these devices function (their defaults, limitations, sounds, 
color, etc.), how they interact and their effects on patients and caregivers (Table 1).  A high rate 
of false alarms can lead to the disabling of notification alerts and alarms as well as detract from 
patient care.  False alarms include both false negative and false positive alarms, and when 
prevalent, quickly lead to clinician mistrust (TJC 2013; Block 1999; Korniewicz 2008; Valentin, 
2006, Cvach 2014).  Alarm fatigue occurs when clinicians become overwhelmed by the total 
number of alarms (Funk 2015). 
Table 1.  Examples of alarming medical devices  
Attached/on the patient In patient room 
Ventilator Nurse call  
Blood warmer Electrosurgical unit 
Sequential compression device Medical gas alarm 
Intra-aortic balloon pump Line isolation monitor 
Defibrillator Chair/bed occupancy alarm 
Pulse oximeter (SA02) Bathroom emergency call button 
Infant warmer Code blue call 
Apnea monitor Bi-pap unit 
Bedside physiological monitor Infusion pump(s) 
Non-invasive blood pressure monitor Tourniquet 
Feeding pump Hypo/Hyperthermia unit 
Infant abduction alarm Injector 
Reference:  Seibig 2010 and alarm data 
The following chapters will further detail and explain the medical device alarm trepidations of 
an integrated Nurse Call system, exploring the various dimensions of a comprehensive alarm 
system included in this research proposal.  This proposal seeks to explore the premises that 
clinician perceptions of the integrated medical device system, specifically alarm system 
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configuration, integrated medical device policies, and alarm system training and education may 
affect the time-to-respond to alarms and subsequently effect patient outcome. 
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BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the background, development and evolution of medical alarm systems 
with a special emphasis on Nurse Call integrated systems.  The topics to be presented in this 
chapter include:   
• A review of alarming medical devices and their evolution of the integration system 
components including hardware, software and middleware.  Several vendor products 
and systems are reviewed.   
• Related national and professional standards and guidelines.  The influence of multiple 
national and professional organizations related to the guidelines and recommendations 
of this advancing technology as well as expectations of the system and clinicians are 
presented.   
• A review of medical device risk assessments and the potential harms to hospitalized 
patients.   
• A discussion of several preliminary research reviews related to the existence of 
literature specific to Nurse Call integrated medical device systems, clinician perceptions 
of an integrated alarm system, and post marker medical device surveillance results 
information.  A new medical device interaction model and the research model for this 
project are presented. 
• Hypotheses and sub-hypotheses presentation. 
• Exploratory research questions to be explored. 
• A brief discussion on culture and consideration of possible applicable theories.    
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Integrated systems and vendor samples (Nurse Call, End Device, Middleware): 
The effectiveness of medical device alarms has been problematic since before 2004.  Early 
developments seeking to improve these issues over the past decade have included: 
• Marquee displays 
• One-way pagers 
• Voice paging (overhead paging) 
Bedside integration emerged and included proprietary interfaces with vendor specific data 
converters that captured the data and alarm messages, sending them to a central station.  
Monitoring companies then began to interface with the same bedside devices which resulted in 
many proprietary interfaces.  Interoperability was not present, and the result was many 
caregivers never receiving the intended messages.  Later software developers produced a 
solution to connect diverse systems across the hospital enterprise.   
Some Nurse Call systems have offered the ability to assign patients to caregivers via a control 
panel and staff assignment whereas the patients are assigned to caregivers with the caregivers 
wearing locator badges with the ability to track the whereabouts of the caregiver via RFID 
(Figures 1, 2, 3).  The person at the control desk can then connect to the caregiver via hard 
wired bi-directional speaker panels located in hallways or patient rooms.   
More recent software integration solutions such as middleware offer the ability to bi-
directionally or multi-directionally connect devices to caregivers and the ability to track 
response times from the medical devices and telephony systems to the caregivers including 
medical devices and telephone systems such as: 
• Nurse Call 
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• Ventilators 
• Infusion Pumps 
• Monitoring systems 
• Wireless phones 
Middleware systems and end-devices software packages offer the communication link from 
medical devices to caregivers allowing the caregiver to receive, respond, escalate or forward to 
another caregiver via configuration input to the systems (Figure 4, 5).  Further advancements 
offer an ability to connect all systems via a single, standards-based approach through a web-
based open interface, service-orientated architecture (SOAP) structure.  This is accomplished 
via an interface and / or adapter (Figure 6).  These systems also offered the opportunity to vary 
where staff assignment occurs, allowing flexibility in the coordination of third-party systems 
and the ability for caregivers to automatically escalate when they cannot answer or reply 
(caregiver can put their end-device into a “busy” mode allowing for automatic escalation).  
These integrated systems are often specifically customized to a hospital or unit needs or 
requests and may become unique to that unit or facility.   
Figure 1.  Hill-Rom Nurse Call System Components 
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Figure 2.  Critical Alert Nurse Call System Components 
 
 
Figure 3.  Nurse Call System Integration 
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Figure 4.  Voalte Communication System
 
 
Figure 5.  Vocera Communication System 
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Figure 6.  Extension Middleware System 
 
Standards and guidelines 
The Joint Commission (TJC) 
In 2004 The Joint Commission (TJC) issued a goal for facilities seeking accreditation to improve 
the effectiveness of clinical alarm systems with requirements to 1) implement regular 
preventive maintenance and 2) testing of alarm systems and to assure that alarms are activated 
with appropriate settings and are sufficiently audible with respect to distances and competing 
noise within the unit.  In 2005 because of continued high compliance rates, this goal was retired 
along with its two requirements. 
Fast forward to April 10th, 2013 TJC issued a Sentinel Event Alert related to medical device 
alarm safety which warned hospitals against alarm fatigue caused by medical devices.  TJC 
stated that 85-99% of the alarms do not require clinical intervention.  Consequently, caregivers 
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became overwhelmed, desensitized, and endure alarm fatigue.   If the caregivers turn off the 
alarm, turns the volume down or changes the default parameters, patient safety is 
compromised.  TJC also reported on 100 alarm-related events occurring between January 2009-
June 2012 with 80 of those resulting in death, 13 in permanent loss of function, and 5 requiring 
unexpected, additional care.  Consequently, the TJC re-issued the National Patient Safety 
Clinical Alarms Standards in 2014 requiring hospitals to identify the most important alarm 
signals to manage and in 2016 required the establishment of policies and procedures for 
managing the most important alarms.  The year 2015 was a data gathering event for the TJC as 
they review hospitals against their accreditation standards and assess whether hospitals have 
identified the most important alarm signals to focus on.  This required hospitals to analyze their 
alarm systems and to identify problem areas to improve on.  In 2017, TJC continued to list 
improving the safety of alarm systems as part of their Hospital National Patient Safety Goals.  
This includes making improvements to ensure that alarms on medical equipment are heard and 
responded to on time (TJC 2017).  This requires leaders to establish alarm safety as a priority, 
obtain input from clinical and medical departments, evaluate risk to patients if the alarm is not 
attended too or equipment or software malfunctions, evaluate whether alarm signals are 
needed or whether they contribute to alarm fatigue, and evaluate the potential for patient 
harm.  This frequent and persistent alarm problem has multiple contributing factors (TJC 2013; 
Block 1999; Korniewicz 2008; Valentin 2006): 
• Absent or inadequate alarm systems 
• Improper alarm settings 
• Alarms signals not audible in all areas 
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• Alarm signals inappropriately turned off 
• Alarm fatigue (most common) 
• Alarm settings not customized to the patient or the patient population 
• Inadequate staff training on the proper use and functioning of the equipment 
• Inadequate staffing to support or respond to alarm signals 
• Alarm conditions and settings that aren’t integrated with other medical devices 
• Equipment malfunctions and failures 
ECRI 
Alarm issues are among the problems most frequently reported to the ECRI.  The ECRI Institute 
(http://www.ecri.org) is a non-profit organization that has been in existence for over forty 
years.  The ECRI has a long history of investigating clinical alarm problems, recommending 
solutions and is designated as an Evidence-Based Practice Center by the U.S. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality and is listed as a federal Patient Safety Organization by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Currently, ECRI recommends that medical 
device alarms be safe, logical and consistent with facility practice, thus encouraging hospitals to 
conduct an internal assessment and implement actions in response to their findings, with 
special consideration for personnel, procedures, equipment and local practice.  Despite their 
long-standing recommendations, alarm hazards have continued to be listed on their Top Ten 
Technology Hazards” annual publication since 2008 (ECRI 2008-2017).  In 2015 ECRI changed 
the alarm hazard to be specific to inadequate alarm configuration policies and procedures (ECRI 
2015).  In 2017, missed alarm for ventilators specifically became part of the Top 10 Health 
Technology Hazards ECRI list.  Ventilators provide life-sustaining therapy and are often 
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combined with the same patients receiving opioids, whereas a missed alarm could prove deadly 
for a patient (ECRI 2017). 
FDA 
The FDA defines “Medical Device Data Systems (MDDS) as hardware or software products that 
transfer, store, convert formats, and display medical device data.  Specifically, a MDDS does not 
modify the data or modify the display of the data, and it does not by itself control the functions 
or parameters of any other medical device. MDDS are not intended to be used for active 
patient monitoring” (FDA 2015).  This definition by the FDA is a move towards defining the 
medical hardware and software component of an integrated system(s) and assists in the 
definition of a “device” which could be the hardware system which “houses” the software. 
AAMI 
The Association for the advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI), a nonprofit 
organization that develops and publishes standards detailing proper production quality for 
medical instruments and the procedures in which they are used where these standards are 
considered one of the benchmarks used in critical health facility inspections. AAMI also serves 
as the secretariat to ISO/TCs 198 and 210 (International Organization for Standardization/ 
Technical Committee), as well as the administrator for the U.S. TAGs (United States Technical 
Advisory Group) and to many ISO/TCs and their subcommittees.  Specifically, AAMI IEC 60601-
1-8 the standard for Medical electrical equipment general requirements for basic safety and 
performance tests and guidance for alarm systems is currently in the process of revision 
(Appendix A).  This not-yet approved amendment (AAMI/IEC 60601-1-08, Amd 2, Medical 
electrical equipment - Part 1-8: General requirements for basic safety and essential 
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performance – Collateral Standard:  General requirements, tests, and guidance for alarm 
systems in medical electrical equipment and medical electrical systems) plans to address: 
• Defining alerts vs. alarms 
• Differentiation of low priority and low priority with audible. 
• Active patient monitoring vs. clinical decision support 
• Primary, secondary and tertiary notifications 
• Secondary alarm as primary alarm 
• Reasonably foreseeable misuse 
• Symbols without English text 
• Guidance for the creation of evidence to demonstrate reasonable assurance of safety 
and efficacy of alarm system algorithms. 
ANSI/AAMI/IEC 80001-1 Standard speaks to the application of risk management for its 
networks incorporating medical devices and supports use of a risk assessment in establishing 
alarm priorities.  These risks are related to patients, operators, or third parties (ANSI/AAMI/IEC 
21010). 
AAMI Healthcare Technology Safety Institute (HTSI) “engages the healthcare community in 
multidisciplinary safety initiatives that strengthen the development, management, and use of 
healthcare technology for improved patient outcomes”.  They have formed a National Coalition 
for Alarm Management Safety and recently convened a focus group to discuss and respond to 
questions about the design of alarm reports and to provide recommendations to alarm 
manufacturers as part of a broader examination of alarm management safety conducted under 
the auspices of the AAMI Foundation the HTSI group.  The participants represented a variety of 
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medical and surgical units from four US hospitals as well as participants with hands-on 
experience compiling, analyzing, and reviewing various alarm reports.  Regarding alarm reports, 
there was variability in time of review (weekly, months, as situation warranted), however these 
reports were noted to promote changes in work procedures such as modifications in nursing 
practice or configuration changes.  Whether these reports contained “meaningful data” was 
questioned, however there was widespread agreement that this data should be collected, 
archived and that alarm condition data be integrated into the hospital’s electronic health 
record (EHR) system (AAMI/HTSI 2015).  The HTSI alarm reports questionnaire was reviewed in 
detail and aided with the questionnaire developed for this research project. 
Combined efforts of TJC, ECRI, AAMI, and FDA 
 
In 2011 an alarm summit was convened with over 300 representatives from AAMI, FDA, TJC, 
and ECRI.  The goal was to address alarm system safety.  When asked for a definition of alarm 
fatigue, the following answer was noted: “alarm fatigue is when a nurse or other caregiver is 
overwhelmed with 350 alarm conditions per patient per day”.  Technical alarms are specific to 
medical devices and have identical prioritization (i.e. Battery without power – high priority, on 
battery with <15 minutes of power – medium priority, Charging – low priority).  One key 
message was delivered through this collaborative exercise: “When process can drive technology 
rather than technology driving process, the system is addressing the problem of alarm fatigue” 
(2011 AAMI Clinical Summit).   
Patient and medical device risk 
The integration of medical device alarm systems is intended to improve or enhance the 
communication of medical device alarms.  This communication via an integrated medical device 
16 
 
alarm system notifies the caregiver and this system is expected to improve caregiver response 
times, henceforward improving patient safety and satisfaction.  Patient safety is expected to 
improve as the communication of the need or potential harm is communicated, however these 
systems don’t fully address the problem or decrease the total number of alarms.  Patient 
satisfaction can be improved by allowing caregivers to communicate directly with the patient 
through in-room speakers or bed speakers.  This direct connection to the patient and caregiver 
provides timely receipt of the patient request.  A study reported an improved response time of 
62 seconds when calls were communication directly to the clinician’s device versus 127 seconds 
for an indirect connection (Kuruzovich 2008).  Patient’s knowledge of their medical device 
alarms communicated directly to their caregiver without a time lapse may also give patient’s 
comfort, however if their alarms go unanswered, patient satisfaction will decline (Purbaugh 
2013).  If a patient need is not addressed in a timely manner, patient safety may be 
compromised. 
The question as to whether the alarm response times are “improved” with implementation is 
unclear as often baseline times may not be measured and the decision to implement an 
integrated system (or portions of) might be due to multiple reasons such as extended response 
times, unintended patient events, or poor patient satisfaction scores.   
Messages sent to end-users generally do not provide clinical information about the alarm or the 
patient status (Bonafide 2015).   This is important as the caregiver have difficulty distinguishing 
between actionable and non-actionable alarms.  Actionable and non-actionable alarms (which 
require no nursing intervention) still exist with an integrated system as the systems are not 
intelligent or smart systems (Cvach 2014).  They purely connect the alarm from the medical 
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device to the communication device and often have complex escalation and routing schemes.  
They are considered secondary notification systems, therefore when systems are not 
functioning, the primary system still operates as intended.   
Further, an integrated system is often viewed as an advanced solution to address the 
communication of medical device alarms, however coupled with increasing workloads and 
decreased staffing there can be difficulty in effectively prioritizing and responding to these 
notifications.  Despite these advanced systems, there continues to be a rise in equipment-
related errors, patient dissatisfaction and continued concerns regarding patient safety (Frisch 
2006).   While this alarm integration in theory is an improvement, it may create an additional 
alarm hazard.  Responding to the issue of alarm hazards requires a holistic approach to the 
patient and caregiver’s environment (Tanner 2013).    
Much of the alarm fatigue stems from default settings which are individualized to the patient 
need, however sometimes they stem from other events such as sensitivity and specificity 
settings or patient or device activity while connected.  Medical device alarm configurations in 
the patient care setting consider the pre-set or “default” values which are manufacturer 
specific, and which often fail to reflect actual patient clinical needs.  For example, a physically fit 
and active hospitalized patient with a normal resting heart rate of 48 may be experiencing 
nuisance alarms due to a default low heart rate setting of 50.  Alarm fatigue can be 
overwhelming for clinicians and patients. 
The assessment of risk for medical devices is required by ISO 14971:2007, Medical devices – 
Application of risk management to medical devices, or the regulatory Global Harmonization 
Task Force (GHTF) states that each system or software application is designated as a medical 
18 
 
device and as such it classified per the level of risk it presents to a patient and organization.  
These requirements address the identification of hazards and the estimation of risk based on 
probability and severity harm assessments.  One method suggested by ISO is to score a risk 
rating for each alarm or when the systems are connected such that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• High – requires immediate attention, device has failed or there is a change in patient 
condition which poses an immediate serious injury or death risk to the patient. 
• Moderate – requires rapid intervention, a device has failed or there is a change in 
patient condition which poses an injury risk or adverse event to the patient if rapid 
intervention doesn’t occur. 
• Low – requires timely intervention, device has failed or there is a change in patient 
condition which may pose an adverse event risk if timely intervention doesn’t occur. 
Following a medical device risk assessment, there should be improved understanding of the risk 
potential and a better understanding of the ability to establish a priority system for the 
communication of alarms.  System improvements and mechanisms can then be put in place to 
help mitigate hazards.  Interface features of medical device alarms should be evaluated for 
collective risk, making it easier to determine how interoperable a system is as well as plan for 
future interoperability improvement projects.   
High-priority alarms require immediate attention; medium-priority alarms indicate a dangerous 
situation requiring a quick response; and low priority alarms indicate that attention is needed 
(Chambrin 2001, IEC60601-1-8).  High priority alarms require immediate attention due to the 
potential for patient injury or death.   Alarm risk assessments are encouraged to help assign 
alarm priority ratings which may be useful when developing alarm policies and procedures and 
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to help determine proper alarm response times.  For purposes of this study, alarm response 
times (defined as TTR) was measured using these IEC classifications: 
• High priority (immediate response required) – less than 1 minute. 
 
o Timeframe is based on the need to take immediate action to save a life, prevent 
suffering or to mitigate injury. 
• Medium priority (requires a quick response) – less than 2 minutes. 
 
o Timeframe is based on recommendations of emergency organizations of a 
response time of <2 minutes can improve the chain of survival (Currents in 
Emergency Care). 
• Low priority (awareness and attention needed) – greater than 2 minutes – less than 5 
minutes. 
o Timeframe is based on the expectation that distributed systems are improving 
those “nuisance alarms” which can lead to alarm fatigue. 
Preliminary research 
This project began with several preliminary literature reviews.  The first was a search of Nurse 
Call Integrated systems followed by a clinician/nurse perception of integrated alarm systems.  
Surprisingly, the literature lacked publications addressing these topics.  Much of the published 
alarm literature is specific to physiological monitoring systems in Intensive Care Units.  This 
researcher was interested in the problems addressing the clinician on the ancillary patient care 
units and the impact of Integrated Nurse Call Systems.  The physiological monitoring and the 
Nurse Call systems capture the majority, but not all medical device alarms, however these two 
systems aren’t often integrated together as one medical device alarm system.  Medical device 
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manufacturers are reluctant to accept the legal risks posed with integration and secondary 
alarm notification systems. 
The research then progressed to evaluating literature addressing global medical device 
surveillance.  The unanswered question of: “How big is the problem of hazards or harms that 
relate to medical devices?” was outstanding.  In seeking to better understand medical device 
alarm issues from a global perspective, a retrospective literature search was performed to 
attain medical device regulatory and post-market environment information specific to these 
questions: 
1. What published information exists regarding post-production surveillance data for 
alarm-related events explicit to medical device alarms globally? 
2. Can the reported alarm-related events be categorized into the ECRI’s proposed 
framework of personnel, local procedure, equipment, and policy and procedure as 
contributing factors to alarm hazards?   
The research began with the WHO transnational country database which identifies Pre-Market 
Controls, Establishment Controls, Inspections, and Post-Market Surveillance by country. Overall, 
the WHO database was found to lack specific information related to recognition of medical 
alarm system issues and post-market requirements.  As concerns are transcultural; 
improvements in recognition, resolution, and surveillance of medical device alarm system 
issues carry broad implications.   
This was followed with a PubMed literature search to identify reported medical device alarm 
issues using predetermined broad, then narrowed search criteria further evaluated by 
countries.  Two-hundred, ninety seventy articles were reviewed from the following countries:  
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France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and 
the United States.  Two-hundred seventy-one articles were reviewed, collated, and analyzed by 
country using the ECRI framework of Medical Device Issues. This global search resulted in the 
identification of issues which were agreeably categorized using the ECRI’s proposed framework 
for the evaluation of medical device events:  personnel, local procedure, equipment, and policy 
and procedure (Appendix B).   These preliminary research findings formed the basis for this 
research of various hypotheses related to nurse perceptions of alarm system configuration, 
integrated medical device policies, and alarm system training and education.   
These four areas were further elaborated using a proposed “Medical Device Interaction 
Model,” term which is an extension of Madeline Leinenger’s Transcultural Nursing theory 
(Leininger, 1995).  This model takes into consideration Leuning, Swiggum, Wiegert and 
McCullough-Zander’s 2002 proposed standards of transcultural nursing practice and 
incorporates the ECRI framework of medical device issues.  The “Medical Device Interaction 
Model” (Lindell 2014) considers the many medical device alarms present in a hospital patient 
setting, referencing them as a system rather than individual medical devices (Figure 7).  
Extrapolations were based on the multi-country publications which demonstrated:  
1. Medical device issues are primarily equipment-related.  Equipment was found to be 
unreliable, confusing, lacking in differentiation, having poor sensitivity and specificity, 
and inadequate system integration.  
2.  People issues such as lack of trust, device confusion, staffing, use errors, and misuse of 
medical devices were found to be universal issues.   
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3. Local procedures for device maintenance, monitoring of alarms, training and education 
programs emerged as inadequate.   
4. Policies and procedures lack specificity related to device use in areas such as setting 
limits, defaults, adjustment, and lack of standardization.  Overall, there was a failure to 
identify, report, and review medical device related alarm incidents.   
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Figure 7.  Medical Device Interaction Model                        
Paradigm by Colleen Lindell 
 
 
 
This model is intended to demonstrate the many factors that may impact caregiver interactions 
with a medical device and or medical device system. 
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Following the preliminary literature research project, the foundation of this research project 
emerged as an exploratory study to address this fundamental question: 
To what extent do the dimensions of alarm system configuration, alarm-related policy and 
procedure, and alarm system education and training impact caregiver response time and 
effect patient outcome? 
Considering the integrated alarm system, three constructs emerged and became the primary 
focus of this research (Figure 8):   
1. Alarm system configuration –  addressing alarm system configuration appropriateness 
and flexibility.  Specifically, customization specific to intervention, unit population, 
individual patient needs, the ability to adapt to changing personnel assignments, 
general configuration, priority settings, the potential for desensitization, routing of 
alarms, nuisance alarms and the ability to communicate exactly where care is needed. 
2. Integrated medical device policy and procedure – addressing the integrated medical 
device policy customizability, policy specificity, and policy awareness.  Specifically, the 
management of the alarm system (written policy and procedure), access to policy and 
procedure, overriding alarm priority, changing alarm priority, alarm assignments, 
recommending changes to alarm assignments or other alarm-related changes, pausing 
and silencing of alarms, routing of alarms, responding to alarms, back up procedures 
when the alarm system is down, responsibilities for monitoring, responding to, 
changing, and testing of the devices/system. 
3. Alarm system education and training – addressing training and education effectiveness 
and comprehensiveness.  Specifically, education addressing alarm monitoring, response, 
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override, various alarming devices, consequences of not responding to alarms, use of 
multiple formats, customization to caregiver needs, refresher training, specificity to 
devices used, how to manage and care for the alarming medical devices, access to 
educational material, additional training for updates to the system, vendor provided 
material, and material provided in-house.   
 
Figure 8.  Research Model 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following analysis of the preliminary research and development of the research model, the 
following three hypotheses were proposed: 
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Hypotheses 1:  Clinician perception of alarm system configuration  
Medical device integration is defined as medical devices which are linked together via a 
network or communication system for improving the communication of medical device alarms 
and alarm response times. How medical devices are configured and managed directly impact 
the workflow of the unit.  There can be a great deal of variation between caregivers, patient 
environments, local, individual and hospital system practice.   Current alarm systems 
demonstrate usability concerns primarily related to clinician’s reduced trust, low efficiency, and 
lack of auditory and visual differentiation of the indication, priority level confusion, and 
ineffective notifications (Korniewicz 2008).  Barton (2011) in her review of clinical decision 
support (CDS) systems comments on information alerts such as interaction alerts and patient 
reminders stating that they “contribute to alert fatigue” and recommends that more 
“pertinent” alerts be provided to staff if an action is required (Sendelbach, 2012).  With so 
many false alarms being present in the healthcare setting, it is predicted that those healthcare 
providers who experience a high number of false alarms become distrusting of medical device 
alarms and will extend their response time based on an assumption that the alarm is either 
insignificant or without validity.  To date, there have been no published nurse call alarm 
configuration “best practices”. 
Alarm sensitivity contributes to the great number of “false alarms” in the healthcare setting, 
however in majority of instances they are not true alarms.  Likewise, if medical devices are 
known to have a high specificity rate, they will be responded to more rapidly.  It is unknown 
whether having an integrated medical device alarm system will result in decreased false alarms 
or improved response times.  Most medical devices do not reject artifact and do not analyze 
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another device comparative settings (for example: oximetry of a pulse oximeter, oximetry of a 
physiologic monitor) to determine specific alarm conditions before alarming (Block 2012).  
Machine learning algorithms for signal quality and physiological data research is being 
performed, however the path to acceptable zero true alarm has yet to be attained (Li 2012).  
Consequently, there are concerns related to medical device configurations such as reliability, 
differentiation, sensitivity, specificity, and with increasing medical devices (and number of 
alarms) per patient, the integrated system is uniquely configured to meet the unit and patient 
clinical needs.  
There are also caregiver impacts to alarms which have recently been studied and include: 
increased occupational stress, decreased work performance, delayed recognition of alarms and 
increased errors (Choiniere 2010, Hsu 2012).   Recent advancements in medical devices and the 
integration of medical device systems in recent years has created systems intended to improve 
patient safety, however these “improvements” have failed to demonstrate improvements in 
caregiver response or to patient safety. 
H1:  Clinician perception of alarm system configuration is positively associated with clinician 
alarm response. 
H1a:  Clinician perception of the appropriateness of alarm system configuration is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
The operational definition for the assessment of appropriateness measures clinician perception 
of alarm having the appropriate priority, configured appropriately, desensitization of alarms, 
alarms sent to the correct provider, ability of the system to pinpoint where care is needed, 
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generation of few or no false alarms, and alarm conflict with other systems measured on a 5-
point scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
H1b:  Clinician perception of the flexibility of alarm system configuration is positively 
associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
The operational definition for the assessment of flexibility is a measurement of clinician 
perception of system customization specific to the type of intervention, unit or for individual 
patient need, and the ability of the system to reset quickly when caregivers are assigned 
measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
Hypotheses 2:  Clinician perception of integrated medical device policy and procedure  
Healthcare providers in hospital settings function with a great deal of protocols, policies, 
guidelines or procedures and therefore we expect less ambiguity with roles and responsibilities 
defined and documented. 
These policy and procedure dimension is applicable to the healthcare environmental 
organization as healthcare providers are responsible for the health and welfare of patients 24 
hours a day/365 day a year.  Decisions are often made, sometimes independently and 
sometimes in collaboration with the patients’ physician.  Sometimes, these decisions are life 
and death type decisions.  Further, a Clinician’s licensure is provided for by the states which 
have written nurse practice acts intended to help to guide and outline clear responsibilities.  
Their organizations of employment (generally hospitals) further establish policies and 
procedures by which the profession is expected to abide by.  Ultimately, as a patient advocate, 
the Clinician must establish a trusting relationship with his/her patient by listening, 
understanding, and allowing patient participation in their healthcare. 
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How systems function can be a contributing factor to situations leading to workplace conflict, 
including adverse alarm events (Funk 2015).  How work is accomplished, codes of conduct, 
organizational values, communication patterns, orientation, making assignments, practice 
guidelines, meeting attendance, policy and procedures, and relational leadership can create 
conflict for caregivers (ECRI, Gerardi 2015, Joseph 2015).  At the unit level, there may be a 
culture of non-inquiry, blame, or mistrust which can create conflict for the caregiver who is 
often overwhelmed with medical device alarms.  Caregivers rely on medical devices to assist 
them in monitoring their patient’s physiological parameters and while they should be familiar 
with the medical device settings the parameters between devices often conflict.  Alarm options 
such as synchronization, adjustment, standardization and incident reporting are set by the unit 
or organizations policies and procedures (Armbruster 2010). 
H2:  Clinician perception of integrated medical device policies is positively associated with 
clinician alarm response. 
H2a:  Clinician perception of the customizability of integrated medical device policies is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
The operational definition for the customizability of clinician perceptions include the pausing of 
an alarm, silencing of an alarm, changing alarm priority, override of priority, changing staff 
assignment, and a back-up system during down time as measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = 
Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
H2b:  Clinician perception of the targeted specificity of integrated medical device policies 
is positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
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The operational definition for the assessment of specificity measures clinician perception of 
alarm having the appropriate priority, configured appropriately, desensitization of alarms, 
alarms sent to the correct provider, ability of the system to pinpoint where care is needed, 
generation of few or no false alarms, and alarm conflict with other systems measured on a 5-
point scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
H2c:  Clinician perception of institutional communication of integrated medical device 
policies is positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
The operational definition for the assessment of communication measures clinician perception 
of alarm management procedures, access to policies, incorporation of staff input, responsibility 
for response of alarms received, responsibilities for changing alarm priorities, and monitoring 
and testing of devices as measured on a 5-point scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = 
Strongly Agree. 
Hypotheses 3:  Clinician perception of alarm system education & training  
Not only are medical device systems complex, the unique alarm devices that form the system 
are multifaceted.  Often, the operating manuals for patient monitors are extensive and 
hospitals receive minimal hard or DVD copies.  Electronic copies may not be available or may be 
difficult to find.  Caregivers are expected to use these devices according to the instructions 
provided in the manual.  Consequently, clinicians are not always knowledgeable or aware of the 
purposes, functions, and adjustments of the alarm device. This results in the alarm system not 
being adapted to the individual patient, which may result in an increased number of false 
alarms if the alarm thresholds are too narrow, and the potent for missed alarms, if the 
thresholds are too wide (Borowski 2011).  Further, this lack of knowledge puts patients at risk.  
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A review of the literature, advocates clinician medical education regarding (Konecny 2003, 
Dumais 2003, Haghnbeck 2005, McConnell 1994, 1995): 
• Intended use of the medical device 
• Manufacturer instructions for use, labeling, warnings, contraindications, and known 
complications 
• Proper use of the medical device 
• Hospital clinical practice’s and education department recommendations or guidelines 
• Recommended maintenance of medical device 
• Knowledge of differences between similar medical devices 
Clinicians are exposed to numerous devices, various software versions, multiple manufacturers, 
different or similar tones, messaging, colors, and use interactions.  Particularly, when clinicians 
move and work at different units or hospitals and care for patient’s different circumstances and 
conditions.   Clinicians need to become aware and stay updated with their patient’s diagnosis, 
pre-existing conditions, allergies, treatments, medications, and effects of multiple device use to 
better understand and anticipate events that may occur (Swayze 2011).  Without proper 
instruction, caregivers may be prone to use errors.  When clinicians lack use knowledge, use 
errors may occur.  These errors can include user actions such as extra key presses, inability to 
ascertain, resolve or acknowledge alarms, which will likely result in a delay in response time.   
Misuse of medical devices includes actions outside of the intended uses or not abiding by the 
manufacturer’s instructions for use.  This would include actions such as silencing latching 
alarms or not plugging in a medical device exhibiting low battery signals (Murphy, 2006). 
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H3:  Clinician perception of alarm system training and education is positively associated with 
clinician alarm response. 
H3a:  Clinician perception of the effectiveness of alarm system training and education is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
The operational definition for the assessment of effectiveness measures clinician perception of 
education or training provided specific to alarm monitoring, response and override, specific to  
various devices on the unit, education specific to alarms they are expected to receive, 
consequences of non-response, multiple educational formats, customized to the clinician’s 
needs, and the provision of periodic refresher education as measured on a 5-point scale where 
1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
H3b:  Clinician perception of the completeness of alarm system training and education is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
The operational definition for the assessment of completeness measures clinician perception of 
education on devices used, how to respond, override to alarms, how to manage and care for 
the devices, additional material availability, additional education when the system is updated, 
and the provision of vendor-specific and in-house educational materials as measured on a 5-
point scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. 
 
These are the central and sub-hypotheses relating to clinician perceptions of the alarm 
configurations, policy and procedure and education and training.   
This study also included additional exploration and comparison of similarities or differences 
between hospitals and clinicians’ response to high, medium and low priority alarms, overall 
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response rates, differences between alarm system configurations, and an evaluation of patient 
adverse event rates. 
Exploratory research questions 
In addition to acquiring insight into the nurse perceptions specific to the three proposed 
constructs, additional questions remain unanswered: 
1. Do caregivers with similar integration systems respond similarly to high, medium and 
low priority alarms? 
2. Do organizations with a lower number of alarms experience faster response rates? 
3. To what extent to alarm configurations vary between organizations? 
4. Do organizations with speedier alarm response times have less adverse event rates? 
Organizational Culture 
Understanding that organizational culture is a shared pattern of beliefs, attitudes, norms, role 
perceptions and values (Triandis, 2002), we find a lack of this type of study specific to the 
healthcare environment, nursing and medical device alarm systems. 
Organizational culture can have a strong effect on individual’s beliefs, attitudes, and behavior 
within the workplace (Martin 1992, Schein 1985, Schein 1990).  Sub-cultures often emerge 
(Schein 1990; Triandis 1972; Guzman, 2008).  Research by Straub et. al in 2002 propose a 
layering effect of culture whereas an individual’s behavior is influenced by national, 
professional or sub-cultural layers (virtual onion metaphor or nesting effect) and they propose 
that the influence is dependent on situational circumstances as well as their own personal 
values.  Personal values may translate to personal perceptions.  Nursing’s professional 
principles center on patient care as they act as patient advocate; within the boundaries of their 
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licensure, with knowledge of national, local and organizational standards (policies and 
procedures) utilizing the tools provided (medical device systems). It is with interest that we 
propose evaluating the clinician perceptions comparatively utilizing the constructs of alarm 
system configuration, integrated medical device policies, and alarm system education and 
training traditionally evaluated as separate constructs within the healthcare or information 
technology environment.   
In seeking to better understand the healthcare work environment and to better appreciate 
various alarm configurations, policy, and educational effects, this research seeks to examine 
these dimensions and their effect on clinician response to alarming medical devices, specifically 
evaluating clinician alarm response (dependent variable) and the impact of nurse call 
configured system, policy and procedure, and education and training (independent variables).  
Theory considerations 
When considering theories relating to this research, two were identified.  Organizational 
identity theory which stems from the Social Identity Theory (SIT).  Per social identity theory, 
individuals are influenced by an overabundance of cultures and sub-cultures, some ethnic, 
some national and some organizational (Straub, 2002).  As suggested by Straub, the individual’s 
social identity crosses all cultural boundaries (national, organizational, professional) and fuses 
together to create one’s overall culture and this combination is unique to individuals.  We 
postulate that nurses in the healthcare profession while following the limitations of their 
licensure and practicing within the organizational expectations (culture of safety), act under 
their own accord, based on a multitude of inputs and belong to a group of Registered nurses 
who are universally known and regarded as patient advocates.  As noted by Gallivan and Srite 
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(2005), there are complex and rich implications based on social identity theory (SIT) and the 
virtual onion metaphor which shapes an individuals’ social identity.  We believe these 
implications may contribute to nurse beliefs and actions when the constructs of policy and 
procedure, medical device, and people intervene, having the potential to affect their response 
to medical device alarms, specifically their “time-to-respond”.  While this research initially 
conducted and measured the culture related aspects which may impact the individual response 
times, it was determined that the study would be too over-whelming for clinicians to include 
culture and the culture portion of the clinician survey was eliminated.  It is however, important 
to recognize that organizational culture and social identity have the potential to impact those 
constructs (people, policy, equipment, and local procedure) which may affect the unique and 
individual medical device interactions. 
The following chapter will discuss the methodology of this multi-hospital, comparative, 
exploratory research study. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This chapter details the research procedure and process used to evaluate the central 
hypotheses and exploratory research questions that guide this study.  The study is divided into 
five parts.  This chapter outlines the procedures used to address the research questions, and 
details the site selection process, and provides rationales for inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
Finally, a review of statistical methods is presented. 
Site Selection 
The University of Wisconsin Milwaukee’s IRB package was submitted for review and approval in 
the Spring of 2016.  Identification of potential hospitals with similar Nurse Call systems and 
patient care units was facilitated by direct inquiry to Major Nurse Call System Provider’s Clinical 
Department Managers (Hill-Rom, Rauland-Borg, Critical Alert) who provided site names and 
contact information.  The hospital patient care unit managers were contacted and invited to 
participate in the study via an electronic inquiry or direct telephone contact.  Upon agreeing to 
participate, hospital IRB packages were submitted and approved prior to study initiation.  A 
clinical representative/manager for each hospital was engaged to assist with the data 
collection.  Inclusion/exclusion criteria were then reviewed.  The clinical 
representative/manager then sent invitations to participate and a hyperlink to their staff via the 
hospital’s internal email system.  Informed consent was included at the beginning of each 
online Qualtrics survey with participant acknowledgment requirement of consent prior to 
participation. 
The study comprised five activities: 
1.  Clinician perception survey. 
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2. Alarm data download capture for 3-months’ time. 
3. Staff interviews.   
4. Review of alarm-related policy & procedure. 
5. Review of alarm-related events (patient outcomes). 
Clinician inclusion criteria 
• At least 3-month experience within the participating unit. 
• Willingness to complete a self-administered online questionnaire. 
Clinician exclusion criteria 
• Less than 3 months working within the participating unit. 
• Inability or unwillingness to complete a self-administered online questionnaire. 
Hospital inclusion criteria 
• Must have an alarm distribution system, minimally consisting of a Nurse Call system and 
an End-Device (secondary communication methods:  telephone, communication 
“badge”). 
Hospital exclusion criteria 
• Lack of an integrated nurse call alarm systems  
• Inability to acquire and provide retrospective and current alarm data for a 3-month 
period. 
Clinician perception survey 
The survey was developed as a modification and enhancement of the HTSI alarm reports 
questionnaire which was completed primarily by Medical Surgical staff.  Additional resources 
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reviewed included integrated alarm system findings published by the ECRI and AAMI (AAMI, 
HTSI 2015).   
The survey was designed to measure clinician perception of: 
1. Alarm system configuration 
2. Integrated medical device policy and procedure 
3. Alarm system education and training 
4. Response to alarms of different priority. 
The clinician provider survey measured staff perceptions and was therefore considered human 
subjects research requiring IRB approval prior to distribution.   
The survey went through several iterations and was pilot-tested with a group of 10 nursing staff 
in September 2015.  Statistical analysis was conducted to evaluate question validity.  Following 
these results, the survey was modified and re-tested with a group of clinicians from the hospital 
setting that actively use devices for alarm notifications.  These modifications were statistically 
analyzed, and the final survey was developed in April 2016 (Appendix C).  The final survey  
included the following: 
• Informed consent  
• 5 descriptive questions: age, job title, time worked as a clinician in the USA/outside the 
USA, and age  
• 43 questions to evaluate 7 constructs using a 5 level, ordinal Likert scale specific to 
clinician perception of alarm configuration, flexibility of the alarm system configuration, 
customizability of integrated medical device policy, specificity of integrated medical 
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device policy, awareness of integrated medical device policy, effectiveness of alarm 
system training, and completeness of alarm system training. 
• 4 questions to estimate the number of alarms per shift, number of high, medium, and 
low priority alarms. 
• 3 questions to estimate the clinician’s response time to high, medium, and low priority 
alarms. 
• 4 open-ended comment responses specific to alarm system configuration, alarm 
response time, alarm system training, and integrated medical device policy and 
procedure. 
The final survey was implemented in 2016 – 2017 and as the survey was not considered a 
validated-for-use instrument, item-to-total correlations and factor analysis was planned to 
assess whether the items effectively measured the constructs used in this research. 
The study was designed as a systematic, exploratory, and generalizable investigation utilizing a 
healthcare provider self-administered online questionnaire to assess medical device alarm 
system perceptions, and the impact of configurations, protocol, policy and education.  The 
questionnaires (Appendix C) were distributed to each patient care unit’s staff member who was 
be sent an email link to the online questionnaire (via QUALTRICS).  The email was sent by the 
clinical nurse manager and included a request for staff members to complete it within two (2) 
weeks’ time.  The survey could be completed via desktop computer, laptop, or mobile device.  
All data were reported in the aggregate.  We expected an 80% (+/- 10%) response rate and a 
minimum of 30 responses per unit.   
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Staff interviews 
Interviews with hospital staff having information specific to the medical device alarm system 
were conducted to provide insight into the alarming medical device presence, alarm system 
configurations, staff, unit and alarm workflows, policy and procedure knowledge, use of Nurse 
Call reports, and alarm-related events.  The interview tool (Appendix F) assisted the interview 
with questions related to medical device historical use, current hardware and software, use of 
middleware, staff assignment, central station, policy and procedure, alarm workflows, use of 
Nurse Call system reports, alarm log historical review, and a discussion of alarm-related events 
as well as contact information for items needing to be requested, such as the data download, 
alarm events, and policy and procedures (Appendix F).  These interviews were conducted after 
IRB approval and prior to or during the clinician perception survey distribution. 
Alarm download data  
Alarm response data were obtained via the IT, Biomedical or Clinical Engineering department 
responsible for electronic, equipment and alarm-related system downloads and the Nurse Call 
System vendors provided 24-hour nurse call alarm type and response-time logs for a 3-month 
period, which included the survey period.  
Time-to-respond was categorized for all types of alarms and was further classified using the 
AAMI into terminology choices: low, medium, and high-priority.  As there were subtle 
differences in naming conventions a standard naming nomenclature was used (ie. Water = 
drink, normal =beep) to provide for consistent data comparison. 
A telephone interview with nursing, IT, clinical or biomedical engineering to ensure data 
completeness and address any gaps was conducted by the author (Appendix F).  The hospital 
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organizations did not have a written definition of expected clinician provider response time. 
Therefore, response times were classified using the IEC/AAMI characterization of high (< 1 
minute), medium (1-2 minutes), and low (2-5 minutes) model for different alarm priority types.    
Alarm-related events review 
This study included a review of actual or potential adverse patient events or outcomes linked to 
the alarm system notification.  The risk manager or quality reviewer was contacted via 
telephone and a discussion of alarm-related events occurred, followed by the provision of a 
detailed description of the patient outcome and an assessment of the potential and actual 
harms. 
Alarm-related policy and procedure review 
The study included a review of existing documents related to alarm conditions noted in 
Appendix F (policies, procedures, log review, adverse or sentinel event reporting, staffing 
models, scheduling, and reported alarm-related events).  The request for this documentation 
was directed at the Unit Nurse Managers.  All data in this segment were de-identified prior to 
review. 
Statistical analysis  
Sample Size 
A power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2014) 
to determine the minimum number of survey responses needed to obtain statistically valid 
results.  This power analysis was based on a multiple linear regression analysis with seven 
predictors and assumed a medium effect size, a power level of .80, and a significance level of 
.05.  The analysis showed that the minimum sample size for this study is 103 respondents. 
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Preliminary Data Cleaning 
Prior to analysis, the data were checked for accuracy, missing cases, and the presence of 
outliers Surveys with large numbers of missing items (i.e., greater than 50%) were excluded 
from the analysis. Data accuracy was checked using frequency distributions to ensure that all 
data points fall within the possible range of values.  The presence of outliers was checked using 
standardized values. Standardized values were calculated for each subscale score (i.e., the 
subscales pertaining to alarm system configuration, integrated medical device policies, and 
alarm system training and education).  Standardized values greater than 3.29 or less than -3.29 
were considered outliers and removed from the data. (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). 
Reliability 
Cronbach’s alpha tests of inter-item reliability was conducted on each of the subscales 
pertaining to alarm system configuration, integrated medical device policies, and alarm system 
training and education.  Cronbach’s alpha provided the mean correlation between each pair of 
items and the number of items in a scale (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2006).  Reliability coefficients 
greater than .7 indicate acceptable inter-item reliability (George & Mallery, 2010). 
Factor Analysis 
As the survey instrument had not been previously validated, it was considered important to 
perform factor analysis to evaluate whether the constructs were distinct, and the items 
measured the construct correctly.  Factor analysis was performed, and the factor structure was 
examined to evaluate individual construct measures. 
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Logistic Regression analysis 
To test the hypotheses of this study, three binary logistic regression analyses were conducted 
after the factor analysis.  Binary logistic regression is an appropriate statistical analysis when 
the aim of the research is to examine the relationship between multiple independent 
continuous variables and a dichotomous dependent variable.  For these analyses, the 
independent variables were the subscales pertaining to alarm system configuration, integrated 
medical device policies, and alarm system training and education.  Each of these variables are 
continuous measures.  The dependent variables were the participants’ self-reported low, 
medium, and high priority alarm response times, categorized as appropriate or inappropriate.   
  Prior to the analyses, the data was checked for multicollinearity.  The absence of 
multicollinearity indicates that the independent variables are not too highly correlated with 
each other.  This assumption was tested using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF).  Per Stevens 
(2009), VIF values over 10 suggest the presence of multicollinearity. 
A separate regression analysis was conducted for each alarm priority. Additionally, the odds 
ratio and predictive modeling were performed to assess the appropriateness of clinician 
response to low, medium, and high alarms.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics were compiled and reported for each variable in the study.  Means and 
standard deviations were reported for continuous variables, including the alarm response 
times, subscales for alarm system configuration, integrated medical device policies, and alarm 
system training and education.  Frequencies and percentages were reported for categorical 
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variables, including job title, gender, country of origin, length of time living in the U.S., and self-
reported alarm response times. 
The following chapter will present findings of the alarm system perception survey, the staff 
interviews, the alarm data download capture, the alarm-related events review, and the alarm-
related policy and procedure review of four midwestern hospital systems.  Quantitative analysis 
results are presented first, followed by qualitative analysis of the interviews and reviews of the 
alarm related events and procedures. 
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RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate Nurse Call alarm management systems which have 
Nurse Call integrated into an end device (mobile phone, etc.). This examination utilized both 
quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate the integrated Nurse Call system.   
The hypotheses related to clinician perceptions of alarm configuration, integrated medical 
device policy, and training and education were assessed by completion of the online clinician 
survey.  Nurse call alarm data download capture and alarm-related patient outcome data were 
evaluated as quantitative data.  The clinician survey comments, staff interviews, and policy 
review were assessed as qualitative data.   
This section begins with a review of the data analyzed.  Response rates and demographic 
summaries of hospital and clinician data is then presented.  This is followed by a review of the 
statistical methods used to evaluate the clinician survey and hypotheses.    The results 
pertaining to the research hypotheses are then presented in detail.  This is followed by an 
analysis of the hospital alarm data, which yielded some insightful observations.  Alarm-related 
events are then discussed.  A collation of clinician survey comments is presented, along with 
some interpretive analysis thereof. The exploratory research questions are then tackled, 
followed by a review of the policy and procedures at each hospital 
Quantitative analysis: 
Clinician survey and hypotheses evaluation:  The seven independent variables were clinician 
perceptions of the medical device alarm system configurations, policy and procedure, and 
education / training questions obtained via clinician survey.  The dependent variable was also 
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obtained via the survey using self-reported response times for high, medium, and low priority 
alarms.   
Alarm data download capture:  A review of actual time-to-respond to specific integrated nurse 
call alarms obtained from was the Nurse Call vendor system for a 3-months’ time.  This data 
was used to evaluate and compare actual response times to self-reported response times for 
the low, medium and high priority nurse call alarms.   Review of actual system alarm data such 
as alarm types and their specific alarm response times were analyzed. 
Alarm-related event data:  A review of all hospital reported alarm-related patient outcome 
events for a 3-month consecutive period.  Alarm events data results were discussed with the 
clinician responsible for obtaining and providing the data. 
Exploratory research questions:  These questions address hospitals having similar integration 
systems, the number of alarms in relation to response times, the extent of variation in alarm 
configuration between organizations, and an evaluation of response times in relation to 
adverse event rates. 
Qualitative analysis: 
Clinician Survey comments:   The self-administered, online, Qualtrics-based survey was 
administered and collated using the University of Wisconsin’s Qualtrics system.  Clinicians were 
asked to provide feedback specific to alarm system configurations, alarm-related policy and 
procedure, and alarm system education and training.  These comments were collated, reviewed 
and presented as suggested feedback for improvement considerations (Appendix C). 
Staff interviews:  Interviews with staff having information specific to the medical device alarm 
system were completed and provided insight into the alarming medical device presence, alarm 
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system configurations, staff, unit and alarm workflows, policy and procedure knowledge, use of 
Nurse Call reports, and alarm-related events (Appendix F). 
Review of Policy & Procedure:  Review of policies related to the medical device alarm system 
including Nurse Call specific policy to evaluate organizational expectations and evaluate 
specificities related to alarm system configurations, and system education and training was 
performed.   Further evaluation of the policy and procedure conformance to The Joint 
Commission 2017 recommendations for making improvements to ensure that alarms are 
responded to on time was conducted was assessed. 
Clinician survey and hypotheses evaluation 
The online survey assessment is a multi-dimensional instrument exploring various aspects of 
clinician responses to the constructs of alarm system configurations, integrated medical device 
policy and procedure, related education and training, and their self-reported response times for 
the high, medium, and low alarm priority types.  The number of completed respondent surveys 
was 107, the number accepted for analysis (excluding those with missing or incomplete data) 
was 105.  This number meets the minimum sample size of 103 required for analysis.   
Four hospitals in the Midwest participated in the study with survey responses (Appendix C) 
from clinicians in 3 hospital systems and 1 large hospital unit.  The response rate was between 
5 - 78% (Table 2).  A total of 107 individuals responded to the clinician survey. Prior to any 
analyses, the survey responses were checked for missing data and the presence of outliers. Two 
respondents were missing data for 50% or more of the survey questions, and therefore were 
excluded from the analyses. Outliers were checked by computing standardized values for each 
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subscale score. Standardized values greater than 3.29 or less than -3.29 are considered outliers 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). No outliers were identified.  
Table 2. Hospital descriptors and survey response 
 Hospital A Hospital B Hospital (Unit) C Hospital D 
Description 22 beds 
Critical access 
13 beds 
Full-service 
36 beds 
Med/Surg/Tele 
150 beds 
Full-service 
Survey 
Invitations 
30 198 121 63 
Survey 
response  
6 10 42 49 
Response %   20% 5% 33% 78% 
 
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of the survey respondents. Most of the participants were 
from either Hospital C (n = 40, 38.1%) or (Hospital D n = 49, 46.7%). Many participants were 
women (n = 91, 86.7%), approximately half of the participants were in the 30 – 50-year age 
range (n = 53, 50.5%), and most participants held a job title of registered nurse (n = 95, 90.5%). 
Most participants indicated that they had not worked as a registered nurse outside the USA (n = 
89, 84.8%), and many participants had worked as a registered nurse in the USA for more than 
10 years (n = 58, 55.2%).  
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Survey Respondents 
Variable Frequency Percent 
   
Hospital   
A 6 5.7 
B 10 9.5 
C 40 38.1 
D 49 46.7 
   
Gender 
  
Female 91 86.7 
Male 14 13.3    
Job title 
  
Registered nurse 95 90.5 
Other 10 9.5    
Time worked as RN outside of USA 
  
I haven’t worked as an RN outside of the USA 89 84.8 
Less than 2 years 1 1.0 
2 – 10 years 7 6.7 
Greater than 10 years 8 7.6    
Time worked as RN in USA 
  
Less than 2 years 10 9.5 
2 – 10 years 37 35.2 
Greater than 10 years 58 55.2 
Age 
  
Less than 30 years 18 17.1 
30 – 50 years 53 50.5 
Greater than 50 years 34 32.4    
Dependent variable 
Self-reported response time (high priority) 
  
Less than 1 minute 88 83.8 
1 – 2 minutes 14 13.3 
2 – 5 minutes 3 2.9    
Dependent variable 
Self-reported response time (medium priority) 
  
Less than 1 minute 30 28.6 
1 – 2 minutes 58 55.2 
2 – 5 minutes 14 13.3 
5 – 10 minutes 3 2.9 
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Dependent variable 
Self-reported response time (low priority) 
  
Less than 1 minute 18 17.1 
1 – 2 minutes 55 52.4 
2 – 5 minutes 25 23.8 
5 – 10 minutes 6 5.7 
10+ minutes 1 1.0 
 
Many participants reported responding to high priority alarms in less than 1 minute (n = 88, 
83.8%), while most participants reported responding to medium (n = 58, 55.2%) and low 
priority (n = 55, 52.4%) alarms in 1 – 2 minutes. When asked about the percentage of alarms 
addressed during a shift, on average participants indicated that 32.43% (SD = 29.61) of the 
alarms they addressed were high priority, 33.80% (SD = 22.97) were medium priority, and 
37.61% (SD = 29.21) were low priority. However, the accuracy of these figures may be 
questionable, as many participants reported cumulative percentages across the three alarm 
types that exceeded 100%.  When comparing the self-reported alarm response time (Table 3) to 
the average actual response times (Table 43) for high, medium, and low priority they matched 
over 70% of the time.   
Hypotheses  
The following hypotheses were developed to evaluate the clinician perception of three 
dimensions of the alarm system:  alarm system configuration, alarm-related policy and 
procedure, and alarm system education and training.   
H1: Clinician perception of alarm system configuration is positively associated with clinician 
alarm response. 
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H1a: Clinician perception of the appropriateness of alarm system configuration is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness.  
• p=0.085 for the medium alarm priority response time 
H1b: Clinician perception of the flexibility of alarm system configuration is positively 
associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
• p=0.063 for the medium alarm priority response time 
H2: Clinician perception of integrated medical device policies is positively associated with 
clinician alarm response. 
H2a: Clinician perception of the customizability of integrated medical device policies is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
• p=0.064 for the low alarm priority response time 
H2b: Clinician perception of the targeted specificity of integrated medical device policies 
is positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
H2c: Clinician perception of institutional communication of integrated medical device 
policies is positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
H3: Clinician perception of alarm system training and education is positively associated with 
clinician alarm response. 
H3a: Clinician perception of the effectiveness of alarm system training and education is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
• p=0.041 for the high alarm priority response time 
H3b: Clinician perception of the completeness of alarm system training and education is 
positively associated with clinician alarm response appropriateness. 
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Hypotheses results 
A multi-step statistical approach was used to assess the survey instrument.   
three binary regression tests assessing high, medium, and low response self-report of response 
times, and examination of the predictive model.  These approaches are detailed below. 
The original statistical analysis with the full set of results are presented in Table 4 and Appendix 
D.   The inter-item reliability of the study subscales pertaining to the seven constructs was 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. Three of the seven constructs demonstrated borderline 
acceptability (<.70 Cronbach’s alpha):   
1. Flexibility of the alarm system configuration 
2. Customizability of integrated medical device policy 
3. Specificity of integrated medical device policy  
The four constructs demonstrating acceptable reliability (>.70 Cronbach’s alpha) included: 
1. Appropriateness of the alarm system configuration 
2. Awareness of integrated medical device policy 
3. Effectiveness of alarm system training 
4. Completeness of alarm system training 
The items pertaining to each subscale were averaged to create composite scores. The inter-
item reliability of the study subscales pertaining to the seven constructs was assessed using 
Cronbach’s alpha (Table 4). 
Table 4.  Original Reliability Coefficients for Study Subscales 
Variable Number of 
Items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Appropriateness of alarm system configuration 7 .77 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration 4 .65 
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Customizability of integrated medical device policies 7 .68 
Specificity of integrated medical device policies 5 .65 
Awareness of integrated medical device policies 7 .90 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 7 .92 
Completeness of alarm system training 8 .81 
 
In efforts to improve reliability scores, based on the inter-item correlation scores, one item 
each was dropped from flexibility of the alarm system configuration customizability of 
integrated medical device policy.  Correlations were performed with item discarded based on 
SPSS software recommendations.  The inter-item reliability of the study subscales with two 
items dropped pertaining to the seven constructs were assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 
5) and resulted in enhanced reliability (Cronbach’s alpha scores >.70) for flexibility of alarm 
configuration and customizability of medical device policy.  The subscales for specificity of 
integrated medical device policies did not demonstrate acceptable reliability; no items could be 
removed to improve the reliability of this factor (Appendix E). 
Table 5.  Revision #1 - Reliability Coefficients for Study Subscales – 2 items drop 
Variable Number of 
Items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Appropriateness of alarm system configuration 7 .77 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration 3 .74 
Customizability of integrated medical device policies 6 .71 
Specificity of integrated medical device policies 5 .65 
Awareness of integrated medical device policies 7 .90 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 7 .92 
Completeness of alarm system training 8 .81 
 
Continued efforts to improve the reliability scores included correlation review on resulting 
items followed by item drops for those with correlations <0.3 dropped.  Correlations were 
performed with item discarded based on SPSS software recommendations.  The revised 
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statistical analysis with the discarded set of results are presented in Appendix E.   The inter-item 
reliability of the study subscales with 6 items dropped (final set) pertaining to the seven 
constructs were assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 6). The final set of items for each 
construct is presented in Tables 7-13. 
Table 6.  Revision #2 - Reliability Coefficients for Study Subscales – 6 items drop 
Variable Number of 
Items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Appropriateness of alarm system configuration 6 .74 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration 3 .74 
Customizability of integrated medical device policies 5 .74 
Specificity of integrated medical device policies 4 .65 
Awareness of integrated medical device policies 7 .90 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 7 .92 
Completeness of alarm system training 7 .81 
 
Table 7.  Appropriateness of Alarm System Configuration (H1a) 
Survey questions (#6) Item Code  
The clinical alarm system is configured appropriately. ASCA1 
The clinical alarm system generates alarms that have the appropriate 
priority. 
ASCA2 
 
The clinical alarm system has not led to desensitization to alarms. ASCA3 
The clinical alarm system routes alarms to the correct providers. ASCA6 
The clinical alarm system generates alarms that conflict with other 
systems. 
ASCA7 
 
The clinical alarm system generates few or no false alarms. ASCA5 
 
Table 8.  Flexibility of Alarm System Configuration (H1b) 
Survey questions (#3) Item Code  
The clinical alarm system can be customized for the type of 
intervention. 
ASCF1 
 
The clinical alarm system can be customized for my unit. ASCF2 
The clinical alarm system can be customized to match individual 
patient needs. 
ASCF3 
 
 
Table 9.  Customizability of Integrated Medical Device Policy (H2a)  
Survey questions (#5) Item Code 
At my organization any provider can override an alarm priority on an 
exception basis. 
MDPC3 
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At my organization any provider can recommend a change to an 
alarm priority. 
MDPC2 
At my organization any provider can recommend a change to an 
alarm assignment (role).   
MDPC6 
At my organization any provider can pause an alarm. MDPC4 
At my organization any provider can silence an alarm. MDPC7 
 
Table 10.  Specificity of Integrated Medical Device Policy (H2b) 
Survey questions (#4) Item Code 
At my organization most, alarms are sent to a limited set of providers, 
instead of a broadcast to all providers. 
MDPS1 
At my organization alarms are set to the correct set of providers. MDPS2 
I do not have to respond to alarms if I am not directly involved in care 
for that specific patient. 
MDPS3 
I receive alarms only on patients that I am currently caring for. MDPS4 
 
Table 11.  Awareness of Integrated Medical Device Policy (H2c) 
Survey questions (#7) Item Code 
My organization has policies and procedures for alarm management. MDPA1 
I am aware of the policies and procedures for alarm management 
at my organization, or I know where to access them. 
MDPA2 
At my organization policies and procedures for alarm 
management incorporate staff input. 
MDPA3 
At my organization policies and procedures for alarm 
management address who is responsible for monitoring and 
responding to alarms. 
MDPA4 
At my organization policies and procedures for alarm 
management address who is responsible for changing alarm 
priorities. 
MDPA5 
At my organization policies and procedures for alarm 
management address the monitoring and testing of medical 
devices that generate alarms. 
MDPA6 
At my organization policies and procedures for alarm 
management address the monitoring and testing of devices that 
relay and receive alarms.   
MDPA7 
 
Table 12.  Effectiveness of Training and Education (H3a) 
Survey questions (#7) Item Code 
My organization provides training and education for alarm 
monitoring, response, and override. 
TEE1 
My organization provides training and education on the various 
alarm devices I use (on my unit). 
TEE2 
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My organization educates providers on the alarms they are expected 
to receive. 
TEE3 
At my organization providers are informed about the 
consequences of not responding appropriately to alarms, for 
patient and provider. 
TEE4 
At my organization education and training material is provided in 
multiple formats.  
TEE5 
The training I received was customized to my needs. TEE6 
My organization provides periodic refresher training sessions. TEE7 
 
Table 13.  Completeness of Training and Education (H3b) 
Survey questions (#7)  Item Code 
My organization provides training on how to respond to alarms. TEC8 
My organization provides training on how to override alarms. TEC2 
My organization provides training on how to manage and care for the 
alarm devices I use. 
TEC3 
I can access additional material at my organization on the alarm 
devices I use. 
TEC4 
I receive additional training whenever the alarm system or its 
components are updated. 
TEC5 
The training I received included vendor supplied material. TEC6 
The training I received included material developed in-house. TEC7 
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Factor analysis 
Considering this study used an unproven instrument (survey) which had not been 
psychometrically validated, the construct correlations were examined and those less than 0.3 
were discarded.   Factor analysis using an oblique rotation was used to confirm the item discard 
(Table 14).   
The following six items were discarded: 
1. The clinical alarm system resets quickly when caregivers are reassigned. (ASCF4) 
2. The clinical alarm system pinpoints where patient care is needed. (ASCA8) 
3. My organization has an alarm management committee that can change the priority of 
alarms. (MDPC1) 
4. My organization has a backup plan when the alarm system is down. (MDPC5) 
5. The number of alarms that I must respond to in a shift is manageable. (MDPS5) 
6. I am fully trained on all the alarm devices that I use. (TEC1) 
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Table 14. Rotated component matrix      
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ASCF1 0.14 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.3 -0.05 0.5 
ASCF2 0.14 0.1 0.05 0.46 0.37 -0.18 0.48 
ASCF3 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.15 0.57 
ASCA1 0.25 -0.02 0.07 0.66 0.25 -0.13 0.08 
ASCA2 0.31 -0.04 -0.06 0.67 0.27 -0.09 0.05 
ASCA3 0.34 -0.06 0.02 0.49 -0.11 -0.04 0.1 
ASCA5 0.18 -0.15 -0.15 0.66 -0.16 0.05 -0.02 
ASCA6 0.07 -0.06 -0.18 0.57 0.28 0.13 0.37 
ASCA7 -0.13 0 0.14 0.74 -0.36 0.03 -0.19 
MDPC2 0.37 0.11 0.4 0.12 -0.34 0.01 0.41 
MDPC3 0.05 -0.05 0.71 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.1 
MDPC4 -0.06 -0.06 0.97 0 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 
MDPC6 0.35 0.08 0.29 0.07 -0.28 0.1 0.36 
MDPC7 -0.15 -0.02 0.97 -0.12 0.05 0.03 -0.03 
MDPS1 0.23 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.72 0.07 0 
MDPS2 0.32 -0.05 0.12 0.52 0.39 0.02 0.17 
MDPS3 0 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.31 -0.06 0.02 
MDPS4 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.86 0.18 0.11 
MDPA1 0.48 0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.11 0.08 
MDPA2 0.61 0.19 0.06 -0.04 0 0 0.03 
MDPA3 0.58 0 0.12 0.39 0.14 0.12 0.05 
MDPA4 0.61 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 0 -0.03 0.11 
MDPA5 0.63 0.02 -0.11 0.16 0.05 -0.07 0.06 
MDPA6 0.53 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.13 0.12 
MDPA7 0.47 0.13 0 0.19 0.06 -0.1 0.14 
TEE1 0.78 -0.06 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.03 0.02 
TEE2 0.77 -0.22 -0.04 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.06 
TEE3 0.82 -0.11 -0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.15 
TEE4 0.62 -0.2 -0.03 0.01 -0.1 0.17 -0.08 
TEE5 0.74 -0.21 0.05 0.04 0.29 0.06 0 
TEE6 0.68 -0.2 -0.11 0.42 0.16 0.17 0 
TEE7 0.66 -0.27 -0.08 0.19 0.32 0.08 0.06 
TEC2 -0.13 1.04 -0.51 0 0.07 -0.2 -0.82 
TEC3 0.01 0.72 0.01 -0.24 0.35 0.04 -0.93 
TEC4 -0.12 1.27 0.02 -0.22 0.05 0 0.18 
TEC5 0.01 0.58 -0.13 -0.07 0.34 1.21 -0.3 
TEC6 0.02 0.88 -0.01 -0.04 -0.22 0.98 -0.2 
TEC7 -0.09 1.11 0.15 -0.09 0.07 0.37 -0.03 
TEC8 -0.16 0.69 -0.35 0.02 -0.08 0.32 0.26 
% of variance 24.92 9.22 7.07 6.64 5.34 5.00 4.12 
Eigenvalue 9.72 3.60 2.76 2.59 2.08 1.95 1.61 
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Factor structure analysis submits that the factors are not flawless.  Two of the constructs 
loaded on the same factor: 
1.  Awareness of integrated medical device policy (MDPA)  
2. Effectiveness of alarm system training (TEE)  
Factor analysis demonstrated that the constructs measured had a mostly clean factor structure, 
however further examinations reveal that these constructs (MDPA, TEE) are loading on the 
same factor demonstrating a correlation and this is concerning.  Undeniably these constructs of 
policy and training are different constructs.  There is no clear explanation as to why this 
occurred.  Other discrepancies include another factor (completeness of alarm system training – 
TEC) has some of the items loading on other factors. Given these constructs are not clearly 
separating, it is possible that they are measuring a larger construct.  There is support for some 
of the construct measures showing independence as some of them show a clear separation, 
however we acknowledge that the awareness of integrated medical device policy and 
completeness and effectiveness of the alarm system training and education constructs lack 
factor independence in this study.   
Binary Logistic Regression 
To address the research hypotheses, three binary logistic regressions were conducted using the 
combined construct scores, not the individual item scores.  Binary logistic regression is an 
appropriate statistical technique when the aim of the research is to determine the relationship 
between multiple continuous independent variables and an ordinal dependent variable. For 
these analyses, the independent variables were the composite scores of the subscales 
pertaining to alarm system configuration, integrated medical device policies, and alarm system 
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training and education. The dependent variables were participants self-reported the low, 
medium, and high priority alarm response times. A separate regression analysis was conducted 
for each dependent variable.  The response times were categorized for the binary regression 
analysis as either appropriate or inappropriate using the clinician self-report time responses 
(Table 15). 
Table 15.  Response time classification 
Level of Priority Appropriate [0] Inappropriate [1] 
High <1 minute 1-2 minutes 
2-5 minutes 
5-10 minutes 
10+ minutes 
Medium <1 minute 
1-2 minutes 
 
2-5 minutes 
5-10 minutes 
10+ minutes 
Low <1 minute 
1-2 minutes 
2-5 minutes 
5-10 minutes 
10+ minutes 
 
Multicollinearity 
Prior to the analysis, the presence of multicollinearity was tested using Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs). Per Stevens (2009), VIF values over 10 suggest the presence of multicollinearity. 
Table 16 displays the VIF values for the independent variables used in the analysis. All values 
were less than 10, indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem (Table 16). 
Table 16. Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables   
Variable VIF 
Appropriateness of alarm system configuration 1.35 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration 1.25 
Customizability of integrated medical device policies 1.06 
Specificity of integrated medical device policies 1.25 
Awareness of integrated medical device policies 2.15 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 2.26 
Completeness of alarm system training 1.14 
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Low Priority Alarm Response Time 
The results of the overall binary logistic regression model predicting low priority alarm response 
time appropriateness were not significant, -2 Log Likelihood = 34.9, Cox + Snell R2 = 0.1, 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.28. The Nagelkerke R2 value indicates that the model accounted for 
approximately 28% of the variability in self-reported low priority alarm response time 
appropriateness. The full results of the regression are presented in Table 17.   
Table 17. Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Self-Reported Low Priority Response Time 
Independent Variable B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig.* Exp(B) 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration 0.09 0.25 0.13 1 0.721 1.09 
Appropriateness of alarm system configuration 0.11 0.13 0.69 1 0.407 1.11 
Customizability of medical device policies -0.31 0.17 3.44 1 0.064 0.73 
Specificity of integrated medical device policies 0.21 0.18 1.27 1 0.259 1.23 
Awareness of integrated medical device policies -0.07 0.2 0.12 1 0.733 0.93 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 0.12 0.13 0.92 1 0.337 1.13 
Completeness of alarm system training -0.19 0.14 1.89 1 0.169 0.83 
Constant -0.65 4.26 0.02 1 0.878 0.52 
*Note:  0.1 alpha used to determine significance. 
These results indicate that the subscales except for customizability of medical device policies 
were not significantly associated with self-reported low priority alarm response time 
appropriateness.  The implications of this construct being significant may indicate that the 
customizability of the medical device policy has influence on the clinician’s response times to 
low priority alarms.  There were associations between perception of the customizability of 
integrated medical device policies and self-reported response times, so H2 sub hypotheses H2a, 
was supported for the low priority response. 
The equation generated from this logistic regress analysis was used to predict clinician response 
to a low priority alarm.  This prediction equation = log(p/(1-p)) =-0.65 + 0.09 Flex + 0.11 
Appropriateness + -0.31 Customizability = 0.21 Specificity + -0.07 Awareness + 0.012 
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Effectiveness + -0.19 Completeness.  Here’s how we interpret the prediction results for the 
clinician response to a low priority alarm.  For example, an Exp(B) of 0.73 as noted in the 
customizability construct can be interpreted as a 1-unit change in the response results in a 27% 
increase of not responding correctly. 
To classify whether this logistic regression model could be used to adequately predict clinician 
response time for low priority alarms, the classification table predicts the percent correct which 
for the low priority model which has an overall accuracy of 94.2% (Table 18). 
Table 18.  Classification Table – Low  
 
 
 
Predicted response 
 
 
%  
correct 
 
Observed 
response 
 0 1  
0 97 0 100 
1 6 0 0 
 
Overall accuracy 
 
 
94.2% 
 
From a model prediction perspective, the classification accuracy of 94.2% for foreseeing 
clinicians’ response to a low priority alarm in an appropriate time frame provides a sense of 
satisfaction in the model and demonstrates that the model is good at predicting appropriate 
responses for the seven constructs.  Of the 103 cases, 97 responses were appropriate and 6 
were not.   
Medium Priority Response Time 
The results of the overall binary logistic regression model predicting medium priority alarm 
response time appropriateness were not significant, -2 Log Likelihood = 131.42, Cox + Snell R2= 
0.09, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.13.  The Nagelkerke R2 value indicates that the model accounted for 
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approximately 13% of the variability in self-reported medium priority alarm response time 
appropriateness. The full results of the regression are presented in Table 19. 
Table 19. Binary logistic Regression Predicting Self-Reported Medium Priority Response Time  
Independent Variable B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig.* Exp(B) 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration -0.19 0.1 3.46 1 0.063 0.82 
Appropriateness of alarm system configuration 0.1 0.06 2.97 1 0.085 1.1 
Customizability of medical device policies -0.01 0.05 0.04 1 0.85 0.99 
Specificity of integrated medical device policies -0.11 0.07 2.3 1 0.129 0.89 
Awareness of integrated medical device policies -0.06 0.07 0.65 1 0.421 0.95 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 0.05 0.06 0.7 1 0.403 1.05 
Completeness of alarm system training 0 0.03 0 1 0.998 1 
Constant 1.66 1.86 0.8 1 0.372 5.26 
*Note:  0.1 alpha used to determine significance. 
These results indicate that all subscales except for those pertaining to the flexibility and 
appropriateness of the alarm system configuration were not significantly associated with self-
reported medium priority alarm response time appropriateness.  The implications of these two 
constructs being significant may indicate that the flexibility and the appropriateness of alarm 
system configuration has influence on the clinician’s response times to medium priority alarms.  
There were associations between perception of alarm system flexibility and appropriateness of 
alarm system configuration and self-reported response times, so H1 and sub hypotheses H1a 
and H1b were supported for the medium priority alarm response. 
The equation generated from this logistic regress analysis was used to predict clinician response 
to a medium priority alarm.  This prediction equation = log(p/(1-p)) =-1.66 + -0.19 Flex + 0.1 
Appropriateness + -0.01 Customizability = -0.11 Specificity + -0.06 Awareness + 0.05 
Effectiveness + 0 Completeness. 
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From a model prediction perspective, the overall classification accuracy of 66.02% (Table 20) for 
foreseeing clinicians’ response to a medium priority alarm in an appropriate time frame does 
not provide a sense of satisfaction in the model’s accuracy in predicting the correct response. 
Table 20.  Classification Table – Medium 
 
 
 
Predicted response 
 
 
%  
correct 
 
Observed 
response 
 0 1  
0 43 14 75.44 
1 21 25 54.35 
 
Overall accuracy 
 
 
66.02% 
 
Of the 103 cases, 43 responses were predicted to be appropriate and 25 predicted to be 
inappropriate.  Incorrect responses of 14 and 21 demonstrates that the model doesn’t classify 
very well and has poor predictive abilities.  For the medium alarm priority, there is a wide range 
of responses and clinician’s may respond sooner or later as opposed to high priority alarms 
where an increased response time is not expected and low priority alarms whereas a longer 
response time is considered appropriate. 
High Priority Response Time 
The results of the overall binary logistic regression model predicting high priority alarm 
response time appropriateness were not significant, -2 Log Likelihood = 83.28, Cox + Snell R2 = 
0.05, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.09.  These results indicate that the subscales pertaining to alarm system 
configuration, integrated medical device policies, and alarm system training and education 
were not significantly associated with self-reported high priority alarm response time 
appropriateness. The Nagelkerke R2 value indicates that the model accounted for 
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approximately 9% of the variability in self-reported high priority alarm response time 
appropriateness. The full results of the regression are presented in Table 21. 
Table 21.  Binary logistic Regression Predicting Self-Reported High Priority Response Time  
Independent Variable B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig.* Exp(B) 
Flexibility of alarm system configuration 0.06 0.14 0.2 1 0.651 1.06 
Appropriateness of alarm system 
configuration -0.01 0.07 0.02 1 0.881 0.99 
Customizability of medical device policies -0.02 0.07 0.04 1 0.841 0.99 
Specificity of integrated medical device 
policies -0.05 0.1 0.3 1 0.585 0.95 
Awareness of integrated medical device 
policies -0.09 0.1 0.88 1 0.349 0.91 
Effectiveness of alarm system training 0.18 0.09 4.16 1 0.041 1.2 
Completeness of alarm system training 0.02 0.05 0.16 1 0.687 1.02 
Constant -3.79 2.75 1.91 1 0.167 0.02 
*Note:  0.1 alpha used to determine significance. 
The results for each binary logistic regression were not significant except for the effectiveness 
of alarm system training and education.  The implications of the effectiveness of alarm system 
training and education’s significance may indicate that this construct has influence on the 
clinician’s response times to high priority alarms.  There were associations between perception 
of effectiveness of alarm system training and education and self-reported response times, so 
sub hypotheses H3a was supported for high priority response. 
The equation generated from this logistic regress analysis was used to predict clinician response 
to a high priority alarm.  This prediction equation= log(p/(1-p)) =--3.79 + 0.06 Flex + -0.01 
Appropriateness + -0.02 Customizability = -0.05 Specificity + -0.09 Awareness + 0.18 
Effectiveness + -0.02 Completeness. 
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From a model prediction perspective, the overall classification accuracy of 84.47% (Table 22) for 
foreseeing clinicians’ response to a high priority alarm in an appropriate time frame provides a 
sense of satisfaction in the model,  
Table 22.  Classification Table – High 
 
 
 
Predicted response 
 
 
%  
correct 
 
Observed 
response 
 0 1  
0 87 0 100 
1 16 0 0 
 
Overall accuracy 
 
 
84.47% 
 
When considering the constructs demonstrating significance for the various priority types, the 
frequency of the type of alarm is an important consideration as the number and type of alarms 
may indicate a pattern of precedence.  Data extracted from Table 23 establishes that most 
alarms are of medium priority (n=58757, 66.5%), followed by high priority (n=28992, 32.8%, 
and low priority (n=558, 0.6%) with the mean time-to-response being  quickest for the high 
priority alarm (n=35.95, SD 192.97), low (n=41.37, SD 67.77), and medium (n=51.67, SD 193.04).  
With low variance in the average clinician response between the three types of alarms and a 
total average time to respond of less than one minute for all alarms, the interpretation of the 
three dependent variables within these confines of limited difference is imperfect. 
Hypotheses analysis summary 
There were associations between perception of alarm system flexibility and appropriateness of 
alarm system configuration and self-reported response times, so H1 and sub hypotheses H1a 
and H1b were supported for the medium priority alarm response. There were associations 
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between perception of the customizability of integrated medical device policies and self-
reported response times, so H2 sub hypotheses H2a, was supported for the low priority 
response. Finally, there were associations between perception of effectiveness of alarm system 
training and education and self-reported response times, so sub hypotheses H3a was supported 
for high priority response. 
While the hypotheses of clinician perceptions were not supported for all priority alarm types, 
there were associations related to the main constructs of alarm configurations, integrated 
medical device policy, and training and education.   
Alarm data download capture 
The frequencies and percentages for the hospital-provided alarm data is presented in Table 23. 
There was a total of 88,307 alarm events across all hospitals included in the final dataset.  Most 
of alarm events came from Hospital D (n = 61471, 69.6%). The most frequent alert type was 
beep (n = 47927, 54.3%) and the most frequent priority type was medium (n = 58757, 66.5%).  
Hospital D exceed the AAMI, FDA, TJC, ACCE and ECRI guidelines, as more than 350 per patient 
alarm conditions per day contribute to alarm fatigue (2011 AAMI Clinical Summit).    
Table 23.  Frequencies and Percentages for Hospital Alarm Data  
Variable Frequency #Alarms/day Percent 
    
Hospital 
 
 
 
A, 22 beds, critical access 1110 12 1.3 
D, 13 beds, full-service 7229 80 8.2 
R, 36 beds, med/surg/tele 18497 205 20.9 
S, 150 beds, full-service 61471 683 69.6   
 
 
Alert Type 
 
 
 
Accident-Linen change 1  0.0 
Assist-Chair 2  0.0 
Aux Jack 586  0.7 
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Bath 5880  6.7 
Bath Emergency 120  0.1 
Bed 396  0.4 
Bed Exit 17017  19.3 
Bed Out 35  0.0 
Beep 47927  54.3 
Code 140  0.2 
Code 2 3  0.0 
Cord Out 179  0.2 
Drink 557  0.6 
Emerg 377  0.4 
Equip 2732  3.1 
iBed Brake 3495  4.0 
iBed Height 52  0.1 
Monitor Alarm/Check 2  0.0 
O2 Sat 4944  5.6 
Pain 532  0.6 
Potty/Toilet 2271  2.6 
Shower 499  0.6 
Siderails 406  0.5 
Staff Assist 140  0.2 
Staff emerg 14  0.0   
 
 
Priority Type 
 
 
 
High 28992  32.8 
Medium 58757  66.5 
Low 558  0.6 
 
One hospital (Hospital C) had the physiological monitoring system integrated into the Nurse Call 
communication system as a tertiary alarm notification system (“monitor alarm/check”) with 
most of the units or hospitals keeping the integration of the full alarm systems separate. 
The average alarm response times are further broken down by average alarm response times 
per hospital for each alarm type including the priority type.  Table 24 displays means and 
standard deviations for alarm response times (measured in seconds) by hospital, alert type, and 
priority type. On average, Hospital A had the lowest response times (M = 31.20, SD = 150.72), 
while Hospital D had the highest (M = 48.28, SD = 211.25). Among alert types, code had the 
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lowest average response time (M = 7.56, SD = 42.58), while monitor alarm/check had the 
highest (M = 1839.50, SD = 622.96). Among priority types, high priority alarms had the lowest 
average response times (M = 35.95, SD = 192.97), while medium priority alarms had the highest 
(M = 51.67, SD = 193.04). 
Table 24.  Average Alarm Response Times (seconds) by Hospital, Alert Type, and Priority Type 
Variable  M SD 
Hospital  
  
A, 22 beds, critical access  31.20 150.72 
B, 13 beds, full service  45.85 244.58 
C, 36 beds, med/surg/tele  41.49 63.57 
D, 150 beds, full service  48.28 211.25  
 
  
Alert Type Priority type 
  
Accident-Linen change Medium 1399.00 * 
Assist-Chair Medium 364.50 430.63 
Aux Jack Medium 35.06 55.28 
Bath High 38.64 60.41 
Bath Emergency High 52.34 58.12 
Bed Medium 155.94 420.35 
Bed Exit High 10.32 24.52 
Bed Out Medium 59.69 62.05 
Beep Medium 39.47 71.07 
Code High 7.56 42.58 
Code 2 High 56.33 95.85 
Cord Out Medium 25.92 36.98 
Drink Low 39.51 51.70 
Emerg High 12.44 24.47 
Equip Medium 32.08 35.44 
iBed Brake Medium 211.78 664.52 
iBed Height Medium 345.38 664.21 
Monitor Alarm/Check Medium 1839.50 622.96 
O2 Sat High 16.69 23.06 
Pain Medium 59.68 160.30 
Potty/Toilet Medium 43.36 47.79 
Shower High 1083.86 977.75 
Siderails Medium 186.02 651.95 
Staff Assist Medium 18.64 21.80 
Staff emerg High 19.36 28.86  
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Priority Type  
  
High  35.95 192.97 
Medium  51.67 193.04 
Low  41.37 67.77 
Note. *Standard deviation could not be calculated due to having only one observation. 
The analysis of response times for high, medium, and low priority alarms was performed using 
the average response time.  Consequently, comparisons made between response and the per 
call type data are limited to the average response times (Table 24).  It was not possible in this 
study to review individual response times due to IRB limitations.  The distribution of alarms 
across the four hospitals is depicted in Figure 9.  It demonstrates that for this study, the smaller 
hospital sizes (Hospital A, B), had comparatively higher number of high priority alarm types.  
Based on staff interview, this was due to a higher number of equipment testing (bed, shower).  
Interestingly, the larger hospitals (Hospitals C, D) had a higher number of medium priority 
alarms over the 3 month review period. 
Figure 9.  Alarm Distribution 
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The time to respond to different alarms is depicted in Figure 10.  It is interesting to note that 
medium priority alarms experienced the longest times to respond.  It is difficult to report exact 
reasons for this however, considerations can be given to alarm overload causing staff to ignore 
alarms, staffing models, patient population, or equipment testing.  A quicker response time was 
expected.  It was outside of the scope of this study to review individual response times because 
of IRB limitations.  These responses correlate with the poor model prediction accuracy (66%) for 
the medium response time appropriateness (Table 20).  Whereas correlations to the high (Table 
21) and low (Table 19) models had higher prediction accuracy and as shown in Table 10, 
response times were appropriate at less than one minute correspondingly. 
Table 10.  Response Time  
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Alarm data download capture summary 
There are wide variations in alarm frequency between the four hospitals (1110-61,471), this is 
probably best explained by varied types of hospitals (Table 2) some being critical access (rural), 
full-service (sub-urban) and Med/Surg/Tele (urban) as well as variations in patient diagnosis 
and needs (data not collected).  The hospital (S) having the most alarms (61,471) had the 
longest response time (48.28 seconds).  The hospital (A) having the least number of alarms 
(1110) had the quickest response rate (31.20 seconds). Not surprisingly, the most frequent 
Nurse call alarm was the patient assist or “beep” alarm (54.3%), followed by bed exit (19.3%), 
bath (6.7%), O2 sat (5.6%).  Most alarms were of medium priority (66.5%), followed by high 
(32.8%), low (0.6%).  The longest mean response times were for Monitor alarm/check (1829 
seconds), accident-linen change (1399 seconds), assist-chair (364 seconds), iBed height (345 
seconds), iBed brake (211 seconds), siderails (186 seconds), and bed (155 seconds).  The 
quickest response was for a Code at 7.56 seconds, followed by bed exit (10.32 seconds), 
emergency (12.44 seconds), O2 sat (16.69 seconds), staff assist (18.54 seconds), and staff 
emergency (19.36 seconds). 
Exploratory research questions 
1. Do caregivers with similar integration systems respond similarly to high, medium and low 
priority alarms? 
Review of the hospital alarm systems reveals varied integration systems (Table 30), therefore 
the answer to this question would be considered speculation.  The average response to high, 
medium, and low priority alarms were similar with all responses under 50 seconds (Table 24). 
2. Do organizations with a lower number of alarms experience faster response rates? 
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Hospital A had the lowest number of alarms (Table 23) for a total of 1,1110 in the 3-month 
period, averaging 12 alarms per day. This number of alarms is specific to the Nurse Call system 
only and does not include other medical device alarms.  The response rate for Hospital A 
averaged the quickest response of all 4 hospitals (Table 24) having an average response time of 
31.20 seconds.  There is support for this investigative question whereas the hospital with the 
lowest number of alarms indeed had a faster response. 
Hospital D has the highest number of alarms (Table 23) for a total of 61,471 in the 3-month 
period, averaging 683 alarms per day.  This number of alarms is specific to the Nurse Call 
system only and does not include other medical device alarms.  The response rate for Hospital 
D averaged the longest response time of all 4 hospitals (Table 24) having an average response 
time of 48.2 seconds.  Comparatively, the hospital with the highest number of alarms had the 
longest response time. 
3. To what extent to alarm configurations vary between organizations? 
Staff interviews revealed the configurations vary greatly between hospitals (Table 30) and there 
were no two hospital configurations the same.  This confounds the ability to define and 
accurately compare similar systems. 
4. Do organizations with speedier alarm response times have less alarm-related adverse 
event rates? 
Hospital A had the quickest average response time of 31.20 seconds (Table 24) with a 
corresponding lowest number (3) of alarm-related events (Table 25).  
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This research supports a faster clinician response associated to lower adverse alarm-related 
patient outcomes, and those with the lowest number of alarms per day having the quickest 
response time. 
Alarm-related events (patient outcomes) 
In the process of requesting and acquiring data specific to alarm-related events, it was clear 
throughout all participating hospitals that the assigned review of a link or a potential link to the 
alarm system was not assessed per se’ and explicitly recorded in the patient event log.  This 
evaluation of an actual of potential link required the hospital’s agent to collect all patient 
outcome data for the 3-month period and individually assess as to whether an alarm-relation 
would or could be present.  The collected data did not include if an alarm was initiated or what 
the delay was in terms of specified time (Table 25).  All events were related to “delays” in the 
provision of clinician identification and care, also known as time-to-respond.  Specific patient 
outcomes were identified as: 
• Potential for physiological harm with potential to affect cardiac, respiratory, or the 
delivery of an intravenous medication = 10 
• Minimal intervention required for physiological harm (cardiac or respiratory) = 2 
• Physiological harm requiring intervention and/or additional procedure (delay in 
bathroom resulting in catheter pulling out when transitioning) = 1 
• Fall with no or minimal harm such as bruising or aching = 8 
• Fall with harm requiring intervention such as x-rays, pain medication, or additional 
procedure = 2 
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Data review of patient harms were related to notifications involving equipment, falls, and 
physiological changes.  Examples of equipment notification included dysfunction with an 
auxiliary jack, displaced cord, absence of bed brake, and other aspects of the bed placing the 
patient at risk.  Included in fall notifications were risks relating to the bath, toilet, shower and 
safety rails.  Physiological notifications included code, emergency, monitor alarm check, oxygen 
saturation, pain, and other signs of pending harm to the patient’s acute life status.   
Table 25.  Alarm-related events per hospital (patient outcomes) 
 Hospital A 
22 beds 
Critical access 
Hospital B 
13 beds 
Full-service 
Hospital (Unit) C 
36 beds 
Med/Surg/Tele 
Hospital D 
150 beds 
Full-service 
 
Total 
Alarm events 3 6 7 7 23 
No Harm 3 4 2 3 12 
Minimal Harm 0 1 1 2 4 
No detectable 
Harm 
0 1 2 2 5 
Harm 0 0 2 0 2 
 
Alarm-related event summary 
The primary risk prevention benefit of Nurse Call alarm systems is falls prevention.  Primary 
reasons for patient-initiated calls were not uncovered, however “beeps” which are patient-
initiated calls were the highest in number, at 47,927 (54.3%).  Notification of the need for 
assistance is critical to preventing patient fall and subsequent injury.  This is accomplished 
primarily through use of the beep, bed, bed exit, bath, bathroom, shower, potty/toilet, side 
rails and assist alarms.  Systems which are integrated into communication devices function as a 
secondary notification system allowing for nearly instant notification to the primary or 
secondary assigned caregivers.  Nurse Calls system’s also helps to address risk related to patient 
physiological changes by communicating equipment malfunctions (brakes not set, bed height, 
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cords not connected) and out-of-range equipment parameters (SA02, monitor alarm check).  
The configuration of an integrated alarm system addressed “who” responds with the option to 
have multiple staff assignments using “escalation” when then primary assigned fails to respond 
after a certain pre-determined timeframe as well as the ability to re-send alarms when critical 
alarms are not cancelled within the patient’s room. 
It is important to note that the average responses for the dependent variables were used for 
analysis with minimal variation in response times across all priority types.  The alarm-related 
events regardless of the degree of harm/no harm were all attributed to delays in response.  As 
the research was analyzed at the unit or hospital level it was impossible to identify the precise 
caregiver, alarm type, and exact response time which is critical to the analysis of patient events. 
Survey comments 
Exploratory analysis of clinician free-text comments relating to alarm response time, alarm 
system configuration, integrated medical device policy, and education and training were 
examined.  Patient adverse events, actual time-to-respond data, and an evaluation of system 
and policy and procedure similarities and differences were conducted to further explore the 
medical device system (Table 26, 27, 28, 29).  The following survey comments relate to the last 
four questions of the survey, were open-ended, free-text fields, asking for clinician feedback 
specific to:   
• Alarm system configurations 
• Alarm response time 
• Integrated medical device and alarm training and education 
• Integrated medical device alarm policy and procedure   
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These comments are noted individually below.  Comments specific to the alarm system 
configuration = 26 comments, alarm response time = 21 comments, hospital unit policies and 
procedures = 12 comments, and medical device education and training = 27 comments.  
Table 26.  Alarm system configuration comments (Q18) 
Hospital A:   
• As an end-user I don't know about the system configuration 
• Clinical alarms do not apply to my position 
• Bathroom alarms and bed/chair alarms should not sound the same. 
• The new alarm system is hard to determine bathroom lights and fall risk 
• New call light system, no training provided. 
• Alarms are not set to individual providers. 
• We are a critical access hospital with limited monitoring capabilities. We do not have an 
ICU or critical care area other than the emergency department. 
• Alarms are not set to individual providers. 
Hospital B: 
• IBEDs are a pain, we need education on the different "zones". 
• We have some new alarms, specifically patient nurse call alarms.  Training was weak, and 
we are still trying to figure the system out. 
• Currently the only configuration with the nurse call system is the bed settings including 
bed exit, and chair exit. No other alarms are yet associated with the call system. other 
independent alarms are IV, telemetry, temperature controls. 
• Non-essential alarms are routed to areas off unit, where pt. is roomed. 
• Not connected to unit that patient is located on. Everything rings in the ED. 
• Configuration poor. 
Hospital C:   
• Can manipulate some alarms to specific needs, but not all. 
• The only alarm training I was given was my Nurse manager called me one day and said I 
needed to manage my alarms better.  yet there was no training in how to accomplish 
that.  I research this area and observed the alarms on our floor and have learned how to 
manage some of the alarms on my own.  I do not have any cooperation from any of the 
RNs in setting their alarms to coincide with what the Pt. is doing.  If they come in w/ HR in 
140s the alarm is left at 120 regardless of the Pt. 
• One problem is that Vocera call light, bed exit, is at times over ridden by tele alarms.  
During this time a PCA / RN cannot override the alarm if they need help. 
• ECG alarms are by far the most difficult to manage especially in the case or low voltage 
QRS waves mixed with elevated t waves resulting in continuously interruptive alarms. 
• The remote tele techs self-train on alarm management.  The only hospital guidelines we 
receive regard how we contact RN's about specific alarms and how much time we must 
make the contact. 
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• There are times when nurses down one wing receive all the alarms rather than their 
specific patients, so the configurations can vary. 
I would like to see quicker responses to alarms 
Hospital D: 
• We are currently undergoing an upgrade - it does not sound beneficial for our 
department. 
• Alarm parameters often reset, causing the need to frequently readjust even when orders 
are present to justify parameter change. 
• Some of the alarms sound the same so is hard to tell what the alarm is for. 
• Bed alarms too sensitive creating more havoc than necessary. 
• We get a lot of false alarms. 
 
Overwhelming, the four hospitals clinician comments reveal that while clinicians can change 
some alarms, there is an in-ability or lack of knowledge of the clinician to manipulate alarms 
specific to patient needs which could contribute to alarm fatigue.  With the inability to manage 
all alarms, the concept of management of alarms becomes vague and could create increases 
concern as well create liability distress for the clinician.  Clinicians may be unaware, lack the 
education and training, or are uninformed of the configuration variations such as alarm priority 
communication settings whereas the system is configured to manage multiple alarm types and 
prioritize their distribution to the clinician.  Several references are made to alarm sound 
confusion, and the inability, lack of ability, or permission of the clinician to override alarms.  
Statements related to what a clinician can and can’t do relate to the hospital or unit specific 
policy and procedures for the integrated system.  Staff assignment of their individual patient 
alarms is an area of misperception whereas clinicians may be removed from assigning or re-
assigning staff-to-patients and have the inability or lack authorization to participate in this task. 
Table 27.  Alarm response time comments (Q19) 
Hospital A:   
• We have a policy that says we must be in the patient's room within 5 minutes of the 
alarm notification. 
• All staff work to answer all alarms. 
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• As an end-user, I am unaware of the response time, but usually within 2-3 minutes 
(managers know this information. 
• Dependent upon area from which they come. 
• Alarms are responded to in less than a minute involving all staff available. 
• Mundane; so many alarms going off that you finish what you are doing before 
responding....no urgency anymore. 
• Very quick alarm response times. We try to minimize alarm fatigue by minimizing alarm 
sounds in our department. 
Hospital B: 
• I work in a small department. 
• Many nurses are desensitized to alarms especially because most are false 
Hospital C:   
• High priority alarms call Vocera which is helpful.  I feel low priority alarms are more 
constant and increase alarm fatigue. 
• 90% of the time I respond quickly to all alarms just to make them stop. 
• The floor responds to their alarms when they feel they have time to do so. 
• We have tried assigning just the RN and PCA to call light, bed alarms but if the nurse and 
PCA are tied up, the call light is not being answered for a long time.  Now we have the 
RN's on a wing helping answer the alarms. 
• Alarm response time seems to most effected by other nurses establishing custom settings 
alarms to the patient need or status, or their response times to alarms. 
• Alarm response time depends on the day and patient workload. 
• Some alarms that are high priority will broadcast to more people hence there is a 
heightened response for a good reason. 
• Quicker responses as this is a cardiac unit. 
Hospital D: 
• I’m in a very small unit, so we do not use the call system at the desk - we just always 
respond in the room. 
• Response time is good. 
• In a unit of this size and layout very difficult to manage. 
• We get a lot of false telemetry alarms. 
 
Overwhelmingly, all four hospitals clinician responses discuss the high number of alarms, 
desensitization and alarm fatigue; citing the number of alarms is overwhelming including 
Hospital C unit which had the lowest frequency of alarms post implementation of an alarm – 
reduction project.  Most clinicians answer alarms quickly to make them stop and there isn’t a 
differentiation as to who is responsible for what type of alarms.  All staff responds to alarms.  
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There is an appreciation of the alarm system configuration noted by Hospital C unit whereas 
the high priority alarms are being distributed to an increased number of staff. 
Table 28.  Integrated medical device education and training comments (Q20) 
Hospital A:   
• New call light system, and no training provided. 
• Most education is done by using the device. 
• We had medical device education a long time ago. 
• Adequate training. 
• Received education and training on older Mindray system several years back, there may 
be newer nursing staff that haven’t had any training. 
• The staff are updated with all new or changing information on all medical devices prior to 
implementing the device system. 
• One training session prior to installation. 
Hospital B: 
• I didn’t receive other than what I learned on the job. 
• Little or no refreshers.  I have worked here a very long time and I feel initial training is 
adequate but follow up on knowledge retention is weak. 
• Training given on Nurse Call and Vocera. 
• We need more 
Hospital C:   
• Easy to ask charge nurse for help - they are the best resource. 
• Training is sporadic and can lag updates. 
• We have no training for alarms 
• Maybe twice per year training or refresher, included in skills day would be nice. 
improvement in refresher would allow for more compliance and better efficient use of 
alarms. 
• My observation is that RNs are not provided any training on how to tailor alarms to the 
individual patient. Consequently, the nurses are fearful of making changes to the default 
parameters. 
• Training is done with the initiation of new equipment. 
• More training is always appreciated. 
Hospital D: 
• As an end-user I am unaware of the response time but usually within 2-3 minutes 
(managers will know this information). 
• Training prior to installing new system. 
• I have not been trained in MANY years on our alarms. 
• This will be overkill, especially in our unit. 
• Good training. 
• Refresher training is always good. 
• We had education on the medical device a long time ago. 
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• Most education is done by using the device. 
• The Vocera trainer was not a good presenter. 
 
Overwhelmingly across the hospital systems, clinician’s response indicates that training and 
education occurs prior to the installation or use of a new system, however this may not be 
complete as it doesn’t always include the entire staff or incorporate staff working after the new 
system is in use.  Education and training is noted to be sporadic, not occurring or occurring with 
use of the medical device system.  A lack of ongoing or refresher training is desired.  
Table 29.  Hospital or unit integrated policies and procedures comments (Q21) 
Hospital A:   
• Policies and procedures are easily accessible and adequately cover everything.  No way to 
know if floor RN is responding until you get to that area (ER nurse). 
• I don’t think there are policies and procedure for this. 
• All staff are educated on how to find policies and procedures on the computer and follow 
policies per facility protocol. 
Hospital B: 
• Alarm policy is in place, but not specific to each piece of integrated equipment such as 
Nurse Call and Vocera. 
• There is a clinical alarm policy and procedure that addresses clinical alarms (continuous 
cardiac monitoring), the administration of intra-muscular medications and intracapsular 
medications and therapies by infusion pumps.  They are adequate. 
Hospital C:   
• 100% sure we have policies and procedures - not always easy to find and can be written 
in jargon 
• I am not aware of any policies and or procedures that are about managing alarms 
• Procedures vary between different units. 
• On our cardiac telemetry unit, we have a tele tech who alerts us with high priority alarms 
or alarms that have been "off the range" for a certain period. E.g. 02 sat at 85 for more 
than 3 minutes or so. 
Hospital D: 
• I am unaware of any policies and procedures on integrated medical devices. 
• Different units use different medical monitoring alarms systems throughout the hospital 
and are monitored by different personnel depending on the unit type. 
• I am not aware of any specific medical device policies and procedures for alarm 
management other than the continuous cardiac monitoring guideline. 
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Almost all hospitals respondents indicate knowing there are policies and procedures in place, 
however some are unaware of their existence and how to access them.  The impact, effect of, 
or importance of integrated medical device policies and procedures is not evident in the 
clinician responses. 
Comments Summary  
Several comments (Q19 – Hospital C, Hospital B, Q19 – Hospital D, Q21 – Hospital C) relate to 
the physiological monitoring and distribution of physiological alarms and the remote 
monitoring of telemetry alarms which increase concern related to the continuous or “false” 
ECG telemetry alarms and the ability of the remote monitor to contact the caregiver.  These 
comments, in addition to the comments specific to the Nurse Call system (bed, bathroom, etc.) 
point to the complexity of the integrated medical device alarm system and support the need for 
clinician contribution to system architecture. 
While this study didn’t address the priority of alarm distribution, it is clear by the comments 
that clinicians question how the system prioritizes the distribution of multiple alarms occurring 
at the same time.  The distribution of alarms via configuration also vary, whereas in certain 
instances or when caregivers aren’t available the alarms distribute to other clinicians 
unassigned to the patient or to the unit caregivers.  Further, this study did not evaluate the 
variations in the distribution and communication of alarms.   
Staff interviews 
Interviews were conducted with Nurse Managers, IT, Clinical and Biomedical engineers, and 
Quality/Risk managers to assist with understanding of alarm systems, configurations, policy and 
procedure implementation, and adverse events related to alarm systems.  These responses are 
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captured in Table 30.  Not one hospital had the components, even those within the same 
hospital system (Hospital A, S, and D). Interview responses relay that each hospital was in a 
different state of updates for both hardware and software.  These same hospitals had varied 
staffing models with no consistent model or means of assigning staff to patients within the 
integrated system.  Patient acuities were no longer measured.  The hospital goal is technology 
standardization, however there was frustration with this process as well as obstacles such as 
logistical unit layout with poor audio systems, varied expected response times, varied unit-by-
unit workflow, no standards for responding, some personnel setting reminders for unanswered 
calls, while others would not set reminders.  Further, there was stated overall staff discomfort 
with a lack of confidence and competence to change the default medical device parameters.  
This hospital did not have their system integrated to the physiological monitoring system, 
ventilators, infusion pumps, or other alarming devices.  Alarm fatigue was specified as having 
effect on staff motivation and workflow efficiency.   While they have an alarm committee, there 
mission was stated as more of having a big picture role, than addressing needs at the unit level.  
Ultimately, the perfect system was viewed as having the alarms go to the right person, the right 
device, and at the right time.  Hospital C had the same system on the unit studied, however 
verbalized different versions of hardware and software throughout the hospital units and 
verbalized issues and concerns similar Hospitals A, B, and D.  Hospital C revealed a recent alarm 
improvement project which measured 12,000 alarms per day on a cardiac unit with up to 99% 
not requiring immediate attention.  This prompted them to allow for change in the oxygen 
saturation threshold (decreased to 87%) and the addition of a 15 second delay in 
communication to the caregiver via the Vocera badge.  They also made a change to the Bed Exit 
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whereas the alarm notification goes to the primary RN and PCA with escalation to unit staff 
after 60 seconds.  This change decreased alarms by 300 per hour with a 90% response by the 
primary caregiver. 
Table 30.  Nurse Call configuration per hospital 
 
 
Interview summary 
Interviews conducted with the hospital representatives and the information obtained 
demonstrate alarm systems that are in flux, with various degrees of integration, use of real-
time locating, continual upgrades of the hardware systems, possible implementation of or 
elimination of a middleware system, and software differences with upgrades or changes that 
may differ between units of a hospital system.  Most Nurse Call reports were only referenced 
for instances of patient adverse events directly related to call response time.  Use of a central 
station varied between units and hospitals and most had no alarm committee established to 
Components Hospital A Hospital B Hospital (Unit) C Hospital D 
 Nurse Call System Hill Rom 
Critical Alert 
Hill Rom 
Critical Alert 
IdeaComm(Rauland) Critical Alert 
Nurse Call Reports Cerner Alert Cerner Alert IdeaComm(Rauland) Cerner Alert 
Middleware 
System 
Cerner iBus Cerner iBus Emergin Cerner iBus 
RTLS System Aeroscout Mission 
Critical 
None Aeroscout 
Communication 
System 
Overhead 
page 
Phones 
Vocera 
Overhead 
page 
Phones 
Vocera 
Overhead page 
Vocera 
Overhead page 
Phones 
Vocera 
Integrated into 
Nurse Call system? 
No No Yes – Vocera, Nurse 
Call, telemetry, 
SA02 
No 
RTLS? Yes No No Yes 
Central station? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Alarm committee? No No Yes No 
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identify a plan to address identification of the most important alarm signals, evaluate alarm 
fatigue and conduct a risk assessment review of alarms.   
Policy and procedure review 
All facilities had periodically reviewed policy and procedures specific to clinical alarm systems, 
however these policies and procedures were primarily limited to the physiological and physical 
patient monitoring alarms which have alarms activated via default, set parameters or self-
activated by the patient.   
The policy and procedure purpose are to ensure that the clinical alarm systems are managed 
and monitored properly so that the systems alert caregivers to potential patient safety 
concerns. 
The Clinical alarm management Policy covered the topics of: 
• Alarm coverage or detectability. 
• Appropriate alarm uses before, during and after patient use. 
• Guidance on safe operation. 
The policy and procedures did not define specific expected clinician response times for Nurse 
Call alarms, however three of the hospitals defined a response time for lethal cardiac 
arrhythmias as noted below.  The alarm “system” was not defined in any of the reviewed policy 
and procedures, however definitions were given for “clinical alarm” and “critical alarm”.  
Clinical alarm = alarm intended to protect the patient receiving care or to alert staff that the 
patient is at increased risk.  These alarms are considered to indicate non-life-threatening 
situations.  None of the sites defined an expected staff time-to-respond. 
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Critical alarm = an audible or visual indication from a system or device, that when activated, 
may result in injury or death of a patient unless immediate clinical intervention results.  
“Immediate” staff response is expected.  A thirty second staff response is expected for lethal 
arrhythmias.  Three sites, specify that if no response within 30 seconds, a code blue will be 
initiated.  Examples of critical alarms included:  Physiologic monitors, Life-sustaining equipment, 
Infusion pumps, and central monitoring systems (tele, fetal monitoring). 
Training and Competence of the alarm system, included: 
• Knowledge of how the alarms are activated. 
• Knowledge of alarm limits based on the type and condition of the patient and 
environmental testing. 
• Knowledge of the operation of the device including equipment self-check 
procedures before and during equipment use. 
• Verification of alarms during transport and at the time of “hand-off”. 
Alarm response is a broad “all staff responsibility”. 
• Staff are responsible to set and activate “appropriate” visual and audible clinical 
alarms.  Considerations include patient’s baseline, current physiological 
assessment, assessment of the disease state, active medical treatment of the 
condition producing the alarm, practitioner prescribed parameters. 
• When alarms are activated, staff must check the patient and evaluate the alarm 
condition before resetting the alarm. 
• Staff are responsible to remove from service and mal-functioning or non-
functioning medical alarm device. 
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• Alarms are not to be disabled or inactivated, except: may be muted or 
suspended for a brief period when a staff member is monitoring, evaluating, or 
treating the patient.  Non-critical alarms (known, stable patient condition) may 
be in-activated. 
• Alarm parameter changes are to be documented on a “report” sheet. 
• No facility specified expected response times specific to alarm types except for 
devices such as physiologic monitors, life-sustaining equipment, infusion pumps 
and central monitoring systems.   
Responsibility for alarm systems is directed to the patient care areas (e.g. “units) who are 
responsible for: 
• Effective alarm coverage. 
• Appropriate alarm use (defaults set at actionable levels). 
• Alarms are annunciated adequately. 
Policy and Procedure review summary 
The policies reviewed were noted to be broadly based as well as Nurse Call agnostic.  
Configuration of the alarm system and the process of alarm review was not discussed.  The high 
priority alarms intended to help prevent patient harms such as Code, Bath, Shower, Bed exit, 
Emergency, and Oxygen saturation (SA02) were not discussed.  Perhaps, this is because the 
knowledge of an immediate response need is a known and expected response of the staff. 
This chapter concludes the results of the alarm system perception survey, the staff interviews, 
the alarm data download capture, the alarm-related events review, and the alarm-related 
policy and procedure review of four midwestern hospital systems.  In the final discussion 
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chapter, interpretations, limitations, differences between different hospitals, and a future 
vision will be discussed. 
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DISCUSSION 
Results of hypothesis testing did not support a significant relationship between the Time-To-
Respond and the alarm system configurations, policy and procedure and education and 
training. Hence the research model validity cannot be fully confirmed based on results from this 
sample of participants.  Relationship support was found; however, each relationship was 
significant for only one of the dependent variables: 
• There were associations between perception of the customizability of integrated 
medical device policies and self-reported response times, so H2 sub hypotheses H2a, 
was supported for the low priority response. 
• There were associations between perception of alarm system flexibility and 
appropriateness of alarm system configuration and self-reported response times, so H1 
and sub hypotheses H1a and H1b were supported for the medium priority alarm 
response. 
• There were associations between perception of effectiveness of alarm system training 
and education and self-reported response times, so sub hypotheses H3a was supported 
for high priority response. 
Alternative explanations for lack of statistical significance for the complete model include: 
1. Use of an unvalidated survey instrument.  While factor analysis was used to confirm 
the underlying constructs, the results are not as clean as desirable.  That can be seen in 
the factor loadings.  Items from 2 constructs loaded on one factor (perception of 
communication of integrated medical device policy and perception of effectiveness of 
the alarm system training and education), and another factor had no construct load on it 
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(perception of training and education effectiveness).  This underlying factor structure is 
not as clean as expected and may be indicative of a greater or different construct. 
2. Clinician differentiation between high, medium, and low priority.  The survey did not 
explain or provide examples of “high”, “medium”, and “low” priority alarms, yet asked 
for self-report specific to these alarm types with accompanying expected response 
times for high, medium, and low priority.  Perhaps, by providing alarm type examples 
versus time response expectations the respondent’s answer might be different. 
The self-report response based on alarm type vs. high, medium, low was similar in 
response times, with the comments reflecting potential confusion when answering 
questions specifically related to high, medium, and low alarms.  Clinicians answer call 
types without direct consideration of priority types and this may have created confusion 
when responding to questions specific to “high”, “medium”, and “low” priority. 
3. Little or no variance between the dependent variables (high, medium, low priority) 
actual self-reported response times.  Consequently, there is little room for the 
independent variables (configuration, policy and procedure, education and training) to 
provide adequate explanation.  Perhaps, if the survey questions were specific to 
response to the high, medium, and low priority alarms were re-written to specific types 
of alarms such as “toilet”, the self-reported responses may differ. 
4. Self-report bias.  The evaluation of the self-report response time for high, medium, and 
low priority against the self-reported perceptions of alarm system configuration, alarm-
related policy and procedure and alarm system education and training is inherently 
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biased as a response is required of all types of alarms and clinicians don’t necessarily 
track their response times or aim to complete the alarm within a set time-frame. 
5. Low response rate overall.  With 3 hospitals and 1 hospital unit participating, and a 
corresponding mean survey response rate of 23.75%, this is low and may not accurately 
reflect generalizable nurse perceptions of the alarm system. 
6. Clinician medical device differentiation confusion.  Clinician comments support medical 
device alarm differentiation confusion. While this research didn’t specifically study 
clinician perception of medical device issues, nor did it match the individual response 
time to the individual’s actual response time, it is evident from the actual data reports 
that the Nurse Call system experienced medical device issues such that both the 
frequency of medical device alarms is high in number (iBed brake alarms #3,495) and 
the response time has variance (Table 24) which could mean the clinician determined 
there were nuisance alarms and ignored many of them. 
7. Differences between different hospitals.  Hospital C had an active alarm improvement 
committee working on unit or patient specific problems such as addressing a high 
number of alarms of one type, whereas Hospitals A, B, and D have an alarm committee 
working at a broader level (system purchases and implementations).  Staffing models, 
staffing roles, responsibilities, as well as patient population types and diagnoses play an 
important role in the differentiation and configuration of alarms.  No two systems were 
alike in their configuration set-up and their hardware and software had variances. 
8. Varied degrees of system integration.  Three of the four hospitals were not “fully 
integrated” whereas they are using the Vocera communication device for clinician-to-
92 
 
clinician communication vs. direct relay of the Nurse Call alarm messages.  The hospital 
with “full” integration (Nurse Calls configured direct to the caregiver or unit via the 
communication device) demonstrated a quicker response time.  This hospital also has an 
alarm committee which reviews alarms of highest risk as well as a review of alarms 
contributing to alarm fatigue.  These variations may have caused clinician confusion 
when answering questions related to the configuration of the alarm system.   
Implications for research 
As this is the first study measuring clinician perception of alarm configurations, policy and 
procedure, and education and training specific to an integrated Nurse Call system and is 
anticipated that these findings will help to shape future research projects specific to integrated 
Nurse Call systems. 
There is limited generalizability to medical device integrated systems overall.  While the study is 
the first hospital comparative integrated Nurse Call study, it included only four Midwest 
hospitals systems and the degrees of integration and standardization may be more advanced in 
other healthcare organizations.  This may impact the survey findings as clinician perceptions 
may differ based on the degrees of integration and system standardization.  This study did not 
include all alarming medical devices.  The focus was on Nurse Call systems which may or may 
not have all other alarming devices integrated into the alarm system. 
Based on the findings of this study, it may be beneficial to compare whether an integrated 
system versus a non-integrated system makes a difference in response times as well as patient 
outcomes.  One benefit of this study is the use of actual alarm-related event data versus the 
use of a proxy (i.e. patient safety culture or perception of patient safety).  Use of a proxy are 
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known to have inverse relationships (Farup 2015), therefore this research supports a true 
measure of patient safety.  Notwithstanding, a system to more accurately identify alarm-related 
events and a process to review these sentinel events is needed to better understand the true 
existence and extent of alarm-related patient events. 
There is a need for further research specific to identifying clinical best practices for education, 
configuration, implementation, and maintenance of a distributed alarm system.  This 
knowledge not only will assist to improve efficiencies but will assist in the attainment of no 
alarm-related patient events.  Delays related to response times continue to affect patient 
outcomes.  Improvement of integrated systems conceptually lead to enhanced human 
caregiver response, improved patient care, and a more meaningful flow between technology 
and people. 
While this research did not focus on the Information Technology aspect of configurations, 
future research specific to configuration relevance, understanding of priorities, algorithms, and 
impact to patients and clinicians is critical to identify areas of improvement.   
Future research should assist with the eventual implementation of an intelligent, distributed 
alarm system which will have the greatest impact for clinicians and patients world-wide. 
There is however, insight value provided through the data download, clinician comments, policy 
and procedure review, staff interviews, and alarm-related events review which provides an 
improved understanding warranting further research of the integrated systems particularly in 
the areas of: alarm configuration, alarm differentiation, training and education, policy and  
procedure, and the prevention of patient harm. 
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Implications for practice 
Alarm configuration:   
In this study, one hospital (Hospital A) had the lowest number of alarms (~12 per day), the 
quickest response times (31.20 seconds), and the lowest number of patient alarm-related 
events (3).  This connection supports the importance of low alarm burden, quick response 
times, and prevention of patient harm.  Conversely, Hospital D had the highest number of 
alarms per day (683) with the longest response time (48.2 seconds) and was tied with Hospital 
C for the number of alarm-related patient events (7).  This connection supports the high alarm 
burden, response time, and patient harm.  The number of alarms in this study is under-reported 
as the research did not include all alarms, however if hospitals accept and adopt the concept 
that >350 alarms per day is overwhelming to clinicians and contributes to alarm fatigue (2011 
AAMI Clinical Summit), the importance of alarm configuration cannot be under-estimated.  
Further with average numbers of alarms between 12 – 683 per day for the Nurse Call system 
only, nurses cannot possibly respond to all alarm devices (Graham 2010, Purbaugh 2013). 
Owners of the “alarm system” is an area of ambiguity.  An integrated system involves not only 
hardware and software, it may involve multiple medical devices (multiple vendors) and a 
middleware system to configure alarm notifications.  It is often unclear whether there is 
potential conflict between systems.  This could affect the priority settings affecting when and 
how the clinician received a high, medium or low priority alarm. 
Medical devices themselves are considered the primary alarming system, however when they 
become part of an integrated alarm system, the secondary alarm notifications help to quickly 
get the alarm notifications to caregivers.  These notifications however, can cause interruptions 
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in the clinician workflow and can contribute to alarm fatigue. This research did not review all 
alarming systems present in the hospital or unit, nor did it review the number of alarms in 
totality.  In a 2015 article, Funk compared the Healthcare Technology Foundations 2005-2006 
online alarm surveys to their 2011 survey and found limited change to the clinical alarm 
hazards, noting only a small percentage of hospitals reporting alarm improvement initiatives 
and 20% relating adverse alarm events (Funk 2015). To fully address alarm fatigue, the total 
number of alarms and all alarming medical devices should be considered.  Hospital or unit 
alarm initiatives continue to be weak and reasons for this should be fully explored. 
Alarm differentiation:   
An assessment of risk for each type of alarm helps to define the priority and determine the 
expected alarm response.  Clinician response in this study did not vary significantly based on 
the type of alarm and the clinician’s voiced an inability to manipulate some alarms, a reluctance 
to change alarm settings, priority confusion, over-alarming (sensitivity) of certain types of 
alarms (ECG), difficulty differentiating the type of alarm due to over-alarming, audible 
similarities in types of alarms with different priorities, location, and communication 
prioritization.   
There may be similarities in the audible and alarm type notifications which may contribute to 
similar response times for high, medium, and low alarms.  This problem points to a continued 
issue with alarm specificity and over-sensitivity.  Many clinician comments reference the high 
number of alarms occurring.  In general, clinicians are expected to respond to all alarms in a 
timely manner.  
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Training and Education: 
Clinicians tend to “learn on the job” as the systems are complex and being upgraded, adjusted 
or software changes occur. Some calls are integrated into the phone or badge, creating a 
primary and secondary notification system, while some notifications just use the primary 
(hardware) system.  Training may be lacking or not available “when needed”, whereas clinicians 
utilize their colleagues as a resource. 
Policy and Procedure: 
Policy and procedures reviewed were ambiguous and non-specific.  It is postulated that having 
policies and procedures specific to the alarm system process will assist clinicians to better 
understand the system as well as increase their involvement in improving the clinical alarm 
system.  Policy and procedure help to define the process and explain systems or processes.   
Discussing configuration settings (including disabling, silencing, volume) as well as the process 
for determining risk assessment of nurse call alarms considering both number and types of 
alarms may help to improve clinician alarm fatigue and improve the alarm differentiation 
confusion that clinician’s experience currently.  
While policy and procedure often abdicate responsibility of parameter changes to the clinician, 
the clinician may experience a lack of confidence, competence, comfort as well as a heightened 
sense of liability to change these parameters.   The lack of alarm initiatives within these 
facilities may contribute to the vague and ambiguous nature of the alarm-related policies and 
procedures. 
It is interesting considering The Joint Commission’s scrutiny in recent years that the 
participating hospitals’ policy and procedure did not specifically address alarm system 
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configuration, the process for determining alarm system configurations, appropriateness, 
customizability, specificity, and the communication between systems.  Further, it was surprising 
to discover the lack of mention of an alarm committee to address specifics such as:  alarm 
fatigue, identification of the most important alarm signals, and the risk assessment review of 
those signals.  Hospital C demonstrated that having a multi-disciplinary alarm committee review 
and recommend changes to the alarm system settings and communication of the medical 
device alarms resulted in changes both to the number of alarms as well as helped to reduce 
alarm fatigue.  Further study of hospitals with established alarm committees would provide 
helpful insight into their ability to impact alarm fatigue and improve patient risk of harm related 
to the alarm system. 
This study reports that while nurse perceptions are not all associated with statistical 
significance to the time-to-respond, actual response times still varied, and alarm events still 
occurred with two events resulting in patient harm requiring intervention and additional care.  
These harms as well as all potential harms with a related and associated Nurse Call were 
evaluated as “delays” in clinician response, therefore a continued review of Nurse Call system is 
warranted.  Hospital policy and procedure ought to detail processes such as: 
• Evaluation of system “pieces and parts”.  As many of these systems are purchased from 
multiple manufacturers with various types and versions of hardware and software, it is 
essential that compatibility exists, and that the system is user-friendly and regularly 
evaluated. Back-up systems for failures in connectivity or networks require further 
investigation as evidenced by the lack of reference in related policies and procedures in 
this study. 
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• A team approach to identify nuisance alarms and alarms of highest risk.  The 
involvement of staff, information technology, biomedical, medicine, and quality or risk 
management in a formalized manner helps to decrease nuisance alarms, decreased the 
total number of alarms, and identify high risk alarms to address as a team (Hospital C).  
• Alarm analytics.  Nurse call systems provide alarm data which can be used to better 
understand the system, configurations, and identify alarms to review further.  Alarm 
data can also provide benefit at the patient, caregiver, unit and hospital level.   
Prevention of patient harm: 
While this research didn’t address the number of false alarms, the total number of alarms was 
high at 981 per day (not including all alarming systems or devices), clinician comments support 
an environment of continued false alarms, and alarm-related events persist.  False alarms not 
only contribute to the noise on the unit, but they also contribute to the persisting sentinel 
events linking to alarm fatigue and are a distraction that interrupts patient care and potentially 
increases the risk for error (Brammer 2012, Funk 2015, AORN 2014).  An exploratory Nurse Call 
research project evaluating the reasons for patient-initiated calls in a cross-sectional, multi-
hospital survey which uncovered the primary reasons to be:  toileting assistance, pain 
medication, intravenous problems, personal assistance, repositioning, or accidental.  
Interestingly, this study also found that only 49% of the clinicians perceived that these patient-
initiated calls mattered to patient safety (Tzeng 2010). 
Patient falls occurred ten times in a three-month period within the four hospitals with root 
causes identified as delays in the provision of care.  The Joint Commission reviewed patient falls 
for a 9-year period (1995-2004) and found that the primary root causes of falls ending in death 
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to be:  inadequate staff communication, incomplete orientation and training, incomplete 
patient assessments and reassessments, environmental issues, incomplete care planning, 
delayed or unavailable care provision, and inadequate organizational culture of safety (TJC 
2005).  A 2009 study reviewed Nurse Call light data and response times of 3 units in a 
Midwestern hospital and found that the average beeps were 4.37 per day with a mean 
response time of 197.68 seconds.  Using the same formula for calculating call light use per 
patient day, this study averaged 4.4 per day with a mean response of 39.4 seconds.  It is 
interesting that most hospitals regard the “beep” patient call as a medium priority alarm, yet 
the risk for a fall harm is high.  Comparatively, this hospital had a higher fall rate of 
approximately 22.6 in a 3-month period.  Interestingly, they also found that increased patient 
calls for assistance may lead to less fall-related patient harm (Tzeng 2008).  More research is 
needs to examine call light use, patient requests, clinician response, the “beep” workflow, the 
effect of alarms on workflows, patient falls, and falls requiring treatment. 
This research may provide additional value to stakeholders such as clinicians, clinical nurse 
managers, hospital administrators, quality and risk prevention personnel, bio-medical or clinical 
engineers, human factors experts, and researchers interested in improving alarm systems.  
Hospitals can use this data to assist with their analysis of data they collect on alarms. 
Public Health 
Implications relative to public health are based on the premise that patient safety is non-
negotiable.  Therefore, the quicker response time to alarms, the better for preservation of 
patient safety.   Given the resulting number of events, desired response time was not 
demonstrated in this study.  Based on these data, there is a need for further  
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examination of the relationship of the three variables of technology, process and procedure, 
and training and education to improve appropriateness of alarm response time to optimize 
patient care.  Additional constructs to be explored that may impact the appropriateness of 
alarm response include:  culture, staffing models, patient population, alarm committee activity, 
and staff workflows that are not only hospital-specific, but department-specific as well. 
Limitations 
1. Survey validation.  While the survey utilized in this study was based on framework 
established by ECRI, it is not considered a validated survey and is therefore subject to 
further analysis and validation.   
2. Low N, Low response rate.  While the study met the minimum statistical requirement 
for analysis, the total N was expected to be higher.  Data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics on the number of Registered Nurses (RNs) in the USA is reported to be 3.1 
million, with 85% being employed in nursing.  This equates to approximately 10 nurses 
per 1,000 persons (BLS 2016). To establish confidence in the results, a larger clinician 
sample size would be required to increase confidence and to establish that the results 
are truly representative of the population. An estimation of an 80% response rate for 
each hospital was predicted, however actual response rates were low at 5%, 20%, 33%, 
and 78% 
3. Clinician interpretation.  While the intent of this research was Nurse Call integrated 
systems, the survey questions were not specific to the Nurse Call system, therefore 
clinician interpretation and answers may relate to other systems such as the 
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physiological systems known for continuous or false alarms (TJC 2013; Block 1999; 
Korniewicz 2008; Valentin, 2006).  
4. Use of high, medium, and low alarm terminology.  Clinicians do not necessarily view 
alarms from this perspective, rather they seem to view from an immediate vs. non-
immediate need.  The difficulty for a clinician evaluating a Nurse Call alarm is that unlike 
a physiological monitor which provides visual and audio cues, the Nurse Call alarms are 
varied and do not provide visual or audio cues that correlate with patient condition.  
They are strictly a means of communicating a condition or need.  Future research should 
make distinctions between alarm types by providing definitions of the types of alarms 
being evaluated and consider the baseline assumption of clinicians that most alarm do 
not represent life-threatening (high priority) conditions (Bonafide 2017). 
5. Clinician self-report bias.  Questions related to response times were overwhelming fast 
with 83.8% asserting a less than 1-minute response for high priority, 55.2% asserting a 
1-2-minute response for medium priority, and 52.4% asserting a 1-2-minute response 
for low priority.  The actual average response rates ranged from 35.95 (high) with a 
standard deviation of 192.97, 51.67 (medium) with a standard deviation of 193.04, and 
41.37 (low) with a standard deviation of 67.77.  Taking into consideration the standard 
deviations, the actual response times data points are in fact spread out over a wide 
range of values. 
6. Perception vs. Real-world.  This study of perceptions impact on response time may not 
accurately reflect the real-world clinical scenario of patient alarms.  In actual patient 
care settings there are many factors that are in constant flux such as staff numbers, 
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nurse-to-patient ratios, location and design of the unit, acoustics and sound, light, and 
competing notifications, patient diagnosis, patient acuity, and most impactful would be 
other competing systems or alarms as well as individual trends or patterns of response.  
This study focused on integrated Nurse call systems at the unit or hospital level and did 
not collect or compare data specific to the unit logistics, individual assigned caregiver 
nor any competing or additional alarm notification systems.   
7. Average alarm response time.  In the real-world, average response times are not 
clinically relevant.  Ideally, the actual response time correlated to the individual clinician 
would provide the most accurate and clinically relevant evidence. 
8. Generalizability.  The findings are applicable to North America, Midwest hospitals only.  
They may generalize to hospitals of similar size; however they are not generalizable to 
all hospitals.  The variations in software and hardware as well as the patient care unit 
types and hospital size do not allow these results to be generalizable to all hospitals.  No 
two hospital configurations were similar.  This confounds the ability to define and 
accurately compare similar systems.  The ability to truly look at the complete medical 
device system is also limited due to the difficulties in obtaining a complete data set of all 
medical-device alarming data and all integrated software systems.  The unit hospitals in 
this study had integrated medical device alarm systems, however all were incomplete 
systems.  They are termed incompletely integrated because following the interviews, 
they all acknowledged a state of fluidity with their systems (varied and different types of 
systems were integrated at the time of this research).  
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9. Alarm correlation.  The alarm data was not correlated to the patient record and 
therefore the ability to identify nuisance alarms associated with medical device 
sensitivity could not be performed. 
10. Clinician correlation to response time.  Due to IRB limitations specific to human subject 
research, it was not possible to correlate the individual self-report response times to the 
actual response times.  This limits the ability to adequately measure response times as 
the variable became the unit response time versus the individual response time and this 
confounds the results. 
11. Medical device logs of alarm download data.  The device logs provided were specific to 
the Nurse Call system and cannot be considered as a complete data set for all medical 
device alarms.  There is no universal system for logging all alarm data into one system.  
Data specific to medical device calibration, cleaning and maintenance records, fault 
codes and intrusion activities per device were not reviewed. 
12. Reporting of patient alarm-related events.  The capture of alarm-related events at all 
hospitals in this study was incidental to this project.  This data was not readily available 
nor do these hospitals have a system of review for assessing the alarm-related 
component of evaluating adverse patient outcomes, therefore the true number of 
alarm-related events is not truly known.  Likely, it is much higher than reported.  As each 
outcome was reviewed by the requestor for this project, it is possible that interpretation 
bias may also ensue.   
13. Failure to report alarm-related incidents.  Alarm-related events were not reported as 
primary events in any of the four (4) hospitals, rather they become part of a secondary 
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review of a patient reported event.  Therefore, the accurate number of alarm-related 
adverse events is truly unknow and likely, under-reported (Leape 1994, TJC 2013). 
14. The “sound or hearing” of the alarm was not reviewed.  Critical alarms must be 
communicated via an audible indication from the system.  While the clinician perception 
survey did assess alarm configuration, it did not specifically measure the effectivity of 
alarm communication and whether the sound was transferred appropriately. 
15. Lacked review of all alarm conditions and setting with all alarm medical devices.  This 
research focused primarily on the Nurse Call alarm system and its integration to a 
communication device and did not incorporate other systems such as physiological 
monitors, infusion pumps, security systems, ventilator, and other medical devices which 
may or may not be integrated within the system.  These results are limited as a sub-
population of the entire alarm system. 
16. Cost differences.   This study did not address nor compare the cost of various systems 
for the different types of system integrations. 
Future vision 
The current alarm system is a complex and confusing system with a need for improvement.  
Clinician comments and patient adverse events support the need for a change in the system.  
An integrated system is considered an advanced system; however, it is not an intelligent alarm 
system.  The answer to whether these systems “improve” alarm notifications, response, and 
patient outcomes is still outstanding.   
The ideal configuration system would be one of inputs from subject matter experts, real-world 
knowledge, and with the ability to be easily or automatically adjusted in an environment of 
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changing patient care and staff needs. This authors’ perception of a “perfect” clinical alarm 
system would be such that the primary caregiver would have one master control panel for each 
patient integrated into the electronic patient record, with malleable defaults, automatic 
notifications, automatic determination of priorities based on call types, and auto-escalations 
based on the physical condition of the patient, availability of caregivers, and the clinician’s plan 
of care.  Perhaps, the ability of the system to automatically assess and configure alarm routing 
so that clinicians are not overwhelmed would help clinicians to respect each alarm as 
meaningful, and important. This requires an open system and an infrastructure whereas 
manufacturers would need to open their platforms, allowing for true hardware and software 
system integration, input of actual patient condition based on real-time data, and primary 
clinician involvement.  In conjunction, a machine learning approach with true device 
interoperability and validated algorithms for the entire system with an ability to suppress false 
alarms may help to reduce false alarms and better predict ongoing patient deterioration (Li 
2012, Hatcliff 2012, Hu 2012). 
A future where alarm reports are not referenced only when an alarm incident occurs but 
become a meaningful and suitable part of nursing analytics with the ability to model the effect 
of subtle changes such as clinician staffing or roles, and patient individual circumstances. 
Finally, the constructs of alarm system configuration, policy and procedure and education / 
training ought to be further studied and research undertaken to develop specific measures for 
these constructs such that this information can be applied towards improvements to practice, 
research, and education.  Further study should aid in the development of conclusive statements 
toward optimizing response time and improving patient outcome. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: IEC 60601-1-8 alarm priority recommendations 
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APPENDIX B: PubMed results of reported issues by country 
 
 
PubMed Categorization 
of Reported Issues 
USA FR GER IRAN NETH UK JP CA NZ AU 
Equipment (121) 77 8 11 1 2 9 1 7 2 3 
Personnel (109) 80 4 7 1 3 7 1 5 0 1 
Local Procedure (50) 37 2 3 0 3 3 0 2 0 0 
Policy/Procedure (17) 14 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
FR=France, GER=Germany, NETH=Netherlands, UK=United Kingdom, JP=Japan, CA=Canada, 
NZ=New Zealand, AU=Australia 
 
Equipment (n=121) - Reliability, lack of differentiation between devices, priority confusion, 
effective exchange of information, sensitivity and specificity, and integrated systems issues 
(software, network, wireless, etc.). 
  
Personnel (n=109) – clinician trust, confusion, staff assignment, staffing model, shift change, role 
clarity, back up procedures.  Lack of intelligent and predictive medical device alarm systems has 
led to nurse distrust, silencing, disabling or turning off medical device alarming system(s), and 
expectations vs. actual may differ.  Misuse of medical device equipment by the end-user (e.g. 
disabling the safety features) is clinician specific. 
  
Local Procedure (n=50) – such as device maintenance, alarm sitters, remote alarm monitoring, 
reporting systems, education or training programs, and real-time temporary changes to alarm 
settings. 
  
Policy and Procedure (n=17) – specific to medical device and their alarms may or may not address 
alarm limits, alarm priorities, default settings, adjusting alarm settings, silencing, notification, 
response (primary, secondary, and tertiary), disabling, standardization, downtime, and 
assignment, accountability for alarm response, adverse event documentation and review. 
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APPENDIX C: Survey 
Q1    
Consent to Participate in Online Survey Research   
Study Title:  Medical device alarm systems:  A multi-hospital study of alarm-related events, caregiver 
alarm response, and their contributing factors.   
Person Responsible for Research:  Colleen Lindell, Derek Nazareth, PhD   
Study Description:  The purpose of this research study is to investigate alarm management systems 
which have Nurse Call integrated into an end device.  Approximately 160 subjects will participate in this 
study.  If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete an online survey that will take 
approximately 10-20 minutes to complete.  The questions will ask about your perceptions of alarm 
configurations, policy and procedures related to alarms and education and training that you’ve received.   
Risks / Benefits:  Risks to participants are considered minimal.  Collection of data and survey responses 
using the internet involves the same risks that a person would encounter in everyday use of the 
internet, such as breach of confidentiality.  While the researchers have taken every reasonable step to 
protect your confidentiality, there is always the possibility of interception or hacking of the data by third 
parties that is not under the control of the research team.   
There will be no costs for participating. There are no benefits to you other than to further research in 
this field of study.     
Limits to Confidentiality Identifying information such as the Internet Protocol (IP) address of this 
computer will be collected for research purposes (linking data collection time points).  Data will be 
retained on the Qualtrics website server for three months and will be deleted after this time.  However, 
data may exist on backups or server logs beyond the timeframe of this research project.  Data 
transferred from the survey site will be saved in an encrypted format for three months.  Only Colleen 
Lindell and Derek Nazareth will have access to the data collected by this study.  However, Derek 
Nazareth PhD, the Institutional Review Board at HealthPartners or appropriate federal agencies like the 
Office for Human Research Protections may review this study’s records.  The research team will remove 
your identifying information before downloading and all study results will be reported without 
identifying information so that no one viewing the results will ever be able to match you with your 
responses.    
Voluntary Participation:  Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You may choose to not answer 
any of the questions or withdraw from this study at any time without penalty.  Your decision will not 
change any present or future relationship with the Regions Hospital or HealthPartners.    
Who do I contact for questions about the study:  For more information about the study or study 
procedures, contact Colleen Lindell at clindell@uwm.edu or 715-254-9173. 
Research Subject’s Consent to Participate in Research: By entering this survey, you are indicating that 
you have read the consent form, you are age 18 or older and that you voluntarily agree to participate in 
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this research study. Thank you! 
 
Q2 Please select your gender: 
 Female (1)  
 Male (2)  
 
Q3 Please select your job title 
 Registered Nurse (1)  
 Other: Enter Job title below (2)  
 
Q4 Select the length of time you've worked as an RN outside of the United States of America 
 I haven't worked as an RN outside of the USA (1)  
 Less than 2 years (2)  
 2 - 10 years (3)  
 Greater than 10 years (4)  
 
Q5 Select the length of time you've worked as an RN in the United States of America 
 Less than 2 years (1)  
 2 - 10 years (2)  
 Greater than 10 years (3)  
 
Q6 Select your age range: 
 Less than 30 years (1)  
 30 - 50 years (2)  
 Greater than 50 years (3)  
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Q7 Please 
respond to the 
following 
items about the 
way the alarm 
system is 
currently 
configured  at 
your 
organization. 
Strongly 
disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
The clinical 
alarm system 
can be 
customized for 
the type of 
intervention. 
(ASCF1)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
can be cust-
omized for my 
unit (ASCF2)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
can be 
customized to 
match 
individual 
patient needs. 
(ASCF3)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
resets quickly 
when caregivers 
are reassigned. 
(ASCF4)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system is 
configured 
appropriately. 
(ASCA1)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
generates 
alarms that 
have the 
appropriate 
priority. 
(ASCA2)  
          
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The clinical 
alarm system 
has not led to 
desensitization 
of alarms. 
(ASCA3)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
routes alarms 
to the correct 
providers. 
(ASCA6)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
generates 
alarms that 
conflict with 
other systems. 
(ASCA7)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
pinpoints where 
patient care is 
needed. 
(ASCA8)  
          
The clinical 
alarm system 
generates few 
or no false 
alarms. (ASCA5)  
          
 
Q8 Approximately how many alarms do you respond to during a shift?  (please enter a numeric) 
Q9 What percentage of the alarms you address during a shift fall into the following categories? 
(please have them total to 100%) 
High Priority (urgent) (4) 
 
Medium priority (normal) (5) 
 
Low priority (6) 
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Q10   Please respond to the following statement about alarm response. 
I usually respond to a "high" priority (urgent) alarms within: 
 Less than 1 minute (1)  
 1-2 minutes (2)  
 2-5 minutes (3)  
 5-10 minutes (4)  
 10+ minutes (5)  
 
Q11 Please respond to the following statement about alarm response. 
 I usually respond to a "medium" priority (normal) alarms within: 
 Less than 1 minute (1)  
 1-2 minutes (2)  
 2-5 minutes (3)  
 5-10 minutes (4)  
 10+ minutes (5)  
 
Q12 Please respond to the following statement about alarm response. 
 I usually respond to a "low" priority alarms within: 
 Less than 1 minute (1)  
 1-2 minutes (2)  
 2-5 minutes (3)  
 5-10 minutes (4)  
 10+ minutes (5)  
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Q13 Please 
respond to the 
following items 
that describe 
how the alarm 
system is 
managed at 
your 
organization. 
Strongly 
disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly Agree 
(5) 
My 
organization 
has an alarm 
management 
committee that 
can change the 
priority of 
alarms. 
(MDPC1)  
          
At my 
organization 
any provider 
can override 
alarm priority 
on an 
exception 
basis. (MDPC3)  
          
At my 
organization 
any provider 
can 
recommend a 
change to an 
alarm priority. 
(MDPC2)  
          
At my 
organization 
any provider 
can 
recommend a 
change to an 
alarm 
assignment 
(role). (MDPC6)  
          
At my 
organization 
any provider 
can pause an 
alarm. (MDPC4)  
          
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At my 
organization 
any provider 
can silence an 
alarm. (MDPC7)  
          
My 
organization 
has a backup 
plan when the 
alarm system is 
down. (MDPC5)  
          
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Q14 Please 
respond to the 
following items 
about the 
alarm 
system at your 
organization. 
Strongly 
disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly Agree 
(5) 
At my 
organization 
most alarms 
are sent to a 
limited set of 
providers, 
instead of a 
broadcast to all 
providers. 
(MDPS1)  
          
At my 
organization 
alarms are set 
to the correct 
set of 
providers. 
(MDPS2)  
          
I do not have to 
respond to 
alarms if I am 
not directly 
involved in care 
for that specific 
patient 
(MDPS 3)  
          
I receive alarms 
only on 
patients that I 
am currently 
caring for. 
(MDPS4)  
          
The number of 
alarms that I 
have to 
respond to in a 
shift is 
manageable. 
(MDPS5)  
          
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Q15 Please 
respond to the 
following items 
about policies 
for the alarm 
system at your 
organization. 
Strongly 
disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
My 
organization 
has policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management. 
(MDPA1)  
          
I am aware of 
the policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management at 
my 
organization, or 
I know where 
to access them. 
(MDPA2)  
          
At my 
organization 
policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management 
incorporate 
staff input. 
(MDPA3)  
          
At my 
organization 
policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management 
address who is 
responsible for 
monitoring and 
responding to 
alarms.  
(MDPA 4)  
          
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At my 
organization 
policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management 
address who is 
responsible for 
changing alarm 
priorities. 
(MDPA5)  
          
At my 
organization 
policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management 
address the 
monitoring and 
testing of 
medical devices 
that generate 
alarms.  
(MDPA 6)  
          
At my 
organization 
policies and 
procedures for 
alarm 
management 
address the 
monitoring and 
testing of 
devices that 
relay and 
receive alarms. 
(MDPA7)  
          
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Q16 Please 
respond to the 
following items 
about training 
and education 
for alarm 
management 
at your 
organization. 
Strongly 
disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
My 
organization 
provides 
training and 
education for 
alarm 
monitoring, 
response, and 
override. (TEE1)  
          
My 
organization 
provides 
training and 
education on 
the various 
alarm devices 
on my unit. 
(TEE2)  
          
My 
organization 
educates 
providers on 
the alarms they 
are expected to 
receive. (TEE3)  
          
At my 
organization 
providers are 
informed about 
the 
consequences 
of not 
responding 
appropriately 
to alarms, for 
patient and 
provider.  
(TEE 4)  
          
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At my 
organization 
education and 
training 
material is 
provided in 
multiple 
formats. (TEE5)  
          
The training I 
received was 
customized to 
meet my needs. 
(TEE6)  
          
My 
organization 
provides 
periodic 
refresher 
training 
sessions.  
(TEE7)  
          
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Q17 Please 
respond to the 
following 
items about 
the training 
that you 
received on 
the alarm 
system at your 
organization. 
Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree (6) 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
(2) 
Agree (3) 
Strongly Agree 
(4) 
I am fully 
trained on all 
the alarm 
devices that I 
use. (TEC1)  
          
My 
organization 
provides 
training on 
how to 
respond to 
alarms. (TEC8)  
          
My 
organization 
provides 
training on 
how to 
override 
alarms. (TEC2)  
          
My 
organization 
provides 
training on 
how to manage 
and care for 
the alarm 
devices that I 
use. (TEC3)  
          
I can access 
additional 
material at my 
organization on 
the alarm 
devices I use. 
(TEC4)  
          
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I receive 
additional 
training 
whenever the 
alarm system 
or its 
components 
are updated. 
(TEC5)  
          
The training I 
received 
included 
vendor 
supplied 
material. 
(TEC6)  
          
The training I 
received 
included 
material 
developed in-
house. (TEC7)  
          
 
Q18 Comments specific to alarm system configuration: 
Q19 Comments specific to alarm response time: 
Q20 Comments specific to integrated medical device education and training: 
Q21 Comments specific to hospital or unit integrated medical device policies and procedures: 
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APPENDIX D: Statistical analysis – with full set 
 
Scale: H1a  
VARIABLES=Q7_6 Q7_7 Q7_8 Q7_9 Q7_10 Q7_11 Q7_12 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 105 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.772 .776 7 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ASCA1 3.3429 .96903 105 
ASCA2 3.3714 1.00247 105 
ASCA3 2.6286 1.07647 105 
ASCA6 3.3143 1.03138 105 
ASCA7 2.8857 1.06802 105 
ASCA8 3.6000 1.00575 105 
ASCA5 2.5905 1.08038 105 
 ASCA1 ASCA2 ASCA3 ASCA6 ASCA7 ASCA8 ASCA5 
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ASCA1 1.000 .669 .381 .420 .289 .507 .292 
ASCA2 .669 1.000 .138 .584 .265 .502 .284 
ASCA3 .381 .138 1.000 .253 .163 .314 .488 
ASCA6 .420 .584 .253 1.000 .103 .465 .263 
ASCA7 .289 .265 .163 .103 1.000 .100 .276 
ASCA8 .507 .502 .314 .465 .100 1.000 .184 
ASCA5 .292 .284 .488 .263 .276 .184 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
ASCA1 18.3905 16.029 .662 .559 .710 
ASCA2 18.3619 16.099 .621 .619 .717 
ASCA3 19.1048 17.095 .432 .388 .756 
ASCA6 18.4190 16.650 .521 .404 .737 
ASCA7 18.8476 18.342 .286 .142 .785 
ASCA8 18.1333 16.828 .516 .372 .738 
ASCA5 19.1429 16.951 .448 .319 .753 
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Scale Statistics 
Mean 
 
 
 
Variance 
 
 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
 
 
N of Items 
 
 
 
21.7333 22.101 4.70120 7 
 
Scale: H1b 
VARIABLES=Q7_1 Q7_2 Q7_3 Q7_4 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 105 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.647 .636 4 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ASCF1 3.4762 .91036 105 
ASCF2 3.5524 1.02826 105 
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ASCF3 3.4762 .97167 105 
ASCF4 3.1810 .85238 105 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 ASCF1 ASCF2 ASCF3 ASCF4 
ASCF1 1.000 .466 .567 .099 
ASCF2 .466 1.000 .456 .203 
ASCF3 .567 .456 1.000 .034 
ASCF4 .099 .203 .034 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
ASCF1 10.2095 4.052 .554 .377 .490 
ASCF2 10.1333 3.713 .540 .298 .490 
ASCF3 10.2095 3.994 .508 .372 .519 
ASCF4 10.5048 5.618 .140 .047 .744 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
13.6857 6.910 2.62867 4 
 
Scale: H2a  
VARIABLES=Q13_1 Q13_2 Q13_3 Q13_4 Q13_5 Q13_6 Q13_7 
Case Processing Summary 
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 N % 
Cases Valid 105 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.675 .674 7 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MDPC1 3.0381 1.00884 105 
MDPC3 2.8476 .98821 105 
MDPC2 3.3048 1.03890 105 
MDPC6 3.2762 .99513 105 
MDPC4 3.1905 1.12741 105 
MDPC7 3.1714 1.13897 105 
MDPC5 3.0571 1.03616 105 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 MDPC1 MDPC3 MDPC2 MDOPC6 MDPC4 MDPC7 MDPC5 
MDPC1 1.000 .237 .191 .124 .095 .070 .292 
MDPC3 .237 1.000 .355 .200 .441 .562 .121 
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MDPC2 .191 .355 1.000 .680 .204 .150 .144 
MDPC6 .124 .200 .680 1.000 .141 .144 .068 
MDPC4 .095 .441 .204 .141 1.000 .716 -.116 
MDPC7 .070 .562 .150 .144 .716 1.000 -.025 
MDPC5 .292 .121 .144 .068 -.116 -.025 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
MDPC1 18.8476 15.150 .268 .143 .670 
MDPC3 19.0381 13.210 .569 .423 .589 
MDPC2 18.5810 13.515 .482 .535 .612 
MDPC6 18.6095 14.452 .374 .474 .642 
MDPC4 18.6952 13.445 .431 .541 .626 
MDPC7 18.7143 13.091 .472 .604 .613 
MDPC5 18.8286 16.220 .118 .134 .709 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
21.8857 18.275 4.27496 7 
 
Scale: H2b   VARIABLES=Q14_1 Q14_2 Q14_3 Q14_4 Q14_5 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 104 99.0 
Excludeda 1 1.0 
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Total 105 00.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.650 .642 5 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MDPS1 2.9423 1.09568 104 
MDPS2 3.1442 1.01845 104 
MDPS3 1.7115 .82053 104 
MDPS4 2.1635 1.17507 104 
MDPS5 3.2404 .99995 104 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 MDPS1 MDPS2 MDPS3 MDPS4 MDPS5 
MDPS1 1.000 .408 .197 .437 .163 
MDPS2 .408 1.000 .097 .345 .452 
MDPS3 .197 .097 1.000 .372 .062 
MDPS4 .437 .345 .372 1.000 .107 
MDPS5 .163 .452 .062 .107 1.000 
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Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
MDPS1 10.2596 7.068 .472 .268 .562 
MDPS2 10.0577 7.162 .517 .350 .541 
MDPS3 11.4904 9.010 .271 .144 .650 
MDPS4 11.0385 6.717 .479 .310 .557 
MDPS5 9.9615 8.387 .281 .209 .651 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
13.2019 11.017 3.31920 5 
Scale: H2c   VARIABLES=Q15_1 Q15_2 Q15_3 Q15_4 Q15_5 Q15_6 Q15_7 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 103 98.1 
Excludeda 2 1.9 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.902 .904 7 
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Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MDPA1 3.7379 .71347 103 
MDPA2 3.6990 .79007 103 
MDPA3 3.2621 .93893 103 
MDPA4 3.5631 .82450 103 
MDPA5 3.3592 .87284 103 
MDPA6 3.4466 .80108 103 
MDPA7 3.3981 .78390 103 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 MDPA1 MDPA2 MDPA3 MDPA4 MDPA5 MDPA6 MDPA7 
MDPA1 1.000 .659 .499 .637 .656 .516 .469 
MDPA2 .659 1.000 .477 .594 .571 .571 .512 
MDPA3 .499 .477 1.000 .643 .662 .442 .510 
MDPA4 .637 .594 .643 1.000 .738 .506 .408 
MDPA5 .656 .571 .662 .738 1.000 .596 .591 
MDPA6 .516 .571 .442 .506 .596 1.000 .776 
MDPA7 .469 .512 .510 .408 .591 .776 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
MDPA1 20.7282 16.200 .712 .567 .889 
MDPA2 20.7670 15.808 .695 .537 .890 
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MDPA3 21.2039 15.046 .669 .526 .894 
MDPA4 20.9029 15.343 .740 .657 .885 
MDPA5 21.1068 14.645 .807 .689 .876 
MDPA6 21.0194 15.706 .701 .667 .889 
MDPA7 21.0680 15.966 .674 .666 .892 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
24.4660 20.800 4.56074 7 
  
Scale: H3a   VARIABLES=Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4, Q16_5, Q16_6, Q16_7 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 104 99.0 
Excludeda 1 1.0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.915 .916 7 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
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TEE1 3.3654 .97600 104 
TEE2 3.4808 .93457 104 
TEE3 3.4615 .96465 104 
TEE4 3.5096 .91371 104 
TEE6 3.2212 1.06084 104 
TEE6 3.1058 1.06048 104 
TEE7 3.0000 1.07937 104 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 TEE1 TEE2 TEE3 TEE4 TEE5 TEE6 TEE7 
TEE1 1.000 .742 .747 .497 .587 .619 .608 
TEE2 .742 1.000 .807 .586 .675 .663 .654 
TEE3 .747 .807 1.000 .601 .649 .607 .504 
TEE4 .497 .586 .601 1.000 .454 .495 .473 
TEE5 .587 .675 .649 .454 1.000 .549 .678 
TEE6 .619 .663 .607 .495 .549 1.000 .585 
TEE7 .608 .654 .504 .473 .678 .585 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
TEE1 19.7788 24.057 .776 .654 .898 
TEE2 19.6635 23.779 .854 .758 .890 
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TEE3 19.6827 23.966 .798 .752 .896 
TEE4 19.6346 25.885 .615 .416 .914 
TEE5 19.9231 23.761 .730 .593 .903 
TEE6 20.0385 23.940 .710 .513 .905 
TEE7 20.1442 23.795 .710 .605 .905 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
23.1442 32.435 5.69520 7 
   
Scale: H3b   VARIABLES=Q17_1, Q17_2, Q17_3, Q17_4, Q17_5, Q17_6, Q17_7, Q17_8 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 104 99.0 
Excludeda 1 1.0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.812 .811 8 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
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TEC1 3.1923 1.34437 104 
TEC8 3.1635 1.22364 104 
TEC2 3.3462 1.59957 104 
TEC3 3.4615 1.51320 104 
TEC4 3.2308 1.55314 104 
TEC5 3.3750 1.60211 104 
TEC6 3.1346 1.53318 104 
TEC7 3.1827 1.50575 104 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 TEC1 TEC8 TEC2 TEC3 TEC4 TEC5 TEC6 TEC7 
TEC1 1.000 .111 .452 .428 .239 .034 .228 .237 
TEC8 .111 1.000 .353 .163 .440 .350 .387 .352 
TEC2 .452 .353 1.000 .531 .401 .301 .353 .385 
TEC3 .428 .163 .531 1.000 .301 .388 .341 .282 
TEC4 .239 .440 .401 .301 1.000 .308 .435 .492 
TEC5 .034 .350 .301 .388 .308 1.000 .537 .358 
TEC6 .228 .387 .353 .341 .435 .537 1.000 .570 
TEC7 .237 .352 .385 .282 .492 .358 .570 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
TEC1 22.8942 52.484 .364 .305 .812 
TEC8 22.9231 51.742 .463 .296 .800 
TEC2 22.7404 45.806 .601 .438 .780 
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TEC3 22.6250 48.004 .529 .409 .791 
TEC4 22.8558 46.979 .563 .366 .786 
TEC5 22.7115 47.974 .488 .396 .797 
TEC6 22.9519 45.988 .627 .483 .776 
TEC7 22.9038 47.059 .584 .416 .783 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
26.0865 61.381 7.83459 8 
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APPENDIX E - Statistical analysis – with discarded items 
 
Scale: H1a 
VARIABLES=Q7_6 Q7_7 Q7_8 Q7_9 Q7_10 Q7_12 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 105 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.738 .742 6 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ASCA1 3.3429 .96903 105 
ASCA2. 3.3714 1.00247 105 
ASCA3 2.6286 1.07647 105 
ASCA6 3.3143 1.03138 105 
ASCA7 2.8857 1.06802 105 
ASCA5 2.5905 1.08038 105 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
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 ASCA1 ASCA2 ASCA3 ASCA6 ASCA7 ASCA5 
ASCA1 1.000 .669 .381 .420 .289 .292 
ASCA2. .669 1.000 .138 .584 .265 .284 
ASCA3 .381 .138 1.000 .253 .163 .488 
ASCA6 .420 .584 .253 1.000 .103 .263 
ASCA7 .289 .265 .163 .103 1.000 .276 
ASCA5 .292 .284 .488 .263 .276 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
ASCA1 14.7905 11.744 .624 .542 .661 
ASCA2 14.7619 11.837 .578 .605 .672 
ASCA3 15.5048 12.502 .416 .365 .719 
ASCA6 14.8190 12.342 .472 .379 .702 
ASCA7 15.2476 13.284 .309 .138 .748 
ASCA5 15.5429 12.077 .477 .313 .701 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
18.1333 16.828 4.10222 6 
 
 
Scale: H1b 
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VARIABLES=Q7_1 Q7_2 Q7_3 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 105 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.744 .747 3 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ASCF1 3.4762 .91036 105 
ASCF2 3.5524 1.02826 105 
ASCF3 3.4762 .97167 105 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 ASCF1 ASCF2 ASCF3 
ASCF1 1.000 .466 .567 
ASCF2 .466 1.000 .456 
ASCF3 .567 .456 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
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Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
ASCF1 7.0286 2.913 .604 .376 .626 
ASCF2 6.9524 2.777 .521 .271 .723 
ASCF3 7.0286 2.759 .593 .369 .633 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
10.5048 5.618 2.37018 3 
 
Scale: H2a 
VARIABLES=Q13_2 Q13_3 Q13_4 Q13_5 Q13_6 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 105 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.738 .737 5 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
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MDPC3 2.8476 .98821 105 
MDPC2 3.3048 1.03890 105 
MDPC6 3.2762 .99513 105 
MDPC4 3.1905 1.12741 105 
MDPC7 3.1714 1.13897 105 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 MDPC3 MDPC2 MDPC6 MDPC4 MDPC7 
MDPC3 1.000 .355 .200 .441 .562 
MDPC2 .355 1.000 .680 .204 .150 
MDPC6 .200 .680 1.000 .141 .144 
MDPC4 .441 .204 .141 1.000 .716 
MDPC7 .562 .150 .144 .716 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
MDPC3 12.9429 9.362 .557 .398 .673 
MDPC2 12.4857 9.656 .460 .528 .707 
MDPC6 12.5143 10.271 .383 .473 .733 
MDPC4 12.6000 8.819 .540 .523 .677 
MDPC7 12.6190 8.623 .566 .600 .666 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
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15.7905 13.706 3.70212 5 
 
Scale: H2b 
VARIABLES=Q14_1 Q14_2 Q14_3 Q14_4 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 104 99.0 
Excludeda 1 1.0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.651 .642 4 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MDPS1 2.9423 1.09568 104 
MDPS2 3.1442 1.01845 104 
MDPS3 1.7115 .82053 104 
MDPS4 2.1635 1.17507 104 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 MDPS1 MDPS2 MDPS3 MDPS4 
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MDPS1 1.000 .408 .197 .437 
MDPS2 .408 1.000 .097 .345 
MDPS3 .197 .097 1.000 .372 
MDPS4 .437 .345 .372 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
MDPS1 7.0192 4.796 .498 .268 .533 
MDPS2 6.8173 5.452 .399 .203 .605 
MDPS3 8.2500 6.481 .295 .142 .662 
MDPS4 7.7981 4.337 .545 .307 .493 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
9.9615 8.387 2.89601 4 
 
Scale: H2c 
VARIABLES=Q15_1 Q15_2 Q15_3 Q15_4 Q15_5 Q15_6 Q15_7 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
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Cases Valid 103 98.1 
Excludeda 2 1.9 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.902 .904 7 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MDPA1 3.7379 .71347 103 
MDPA2 3.6990 .79007 103 
MDPA3 3.2621 .93893 103 
MDPA4 3.5631 .82450 103 
MDPA5 3.3592 .87284 103 
MDPA6 3.4466 .80108 103 
MDPA7 3.3981 .78390 103 
 
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 MDPA1 MDPA2 MDPA3 MDPA4 MDPA5 MDPA6 MDPA7 
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MDPA1 1.000 .659 .499 .637 .656 .516 .469 
MDPA2 .659 1.000 .477 .594 .571 .571 .512 
MDPA3 .499 .477 1.000 .643 .662 .442 .510 
MDPA4 .637 .594 .643 1.000 .738 .506 .408 
MDPA5. .656 .571 .662 .738 1.000 .596 .591 
MDPA6 .516 .571 .442 .506 .596 1.000 .776 
MDPA7 .469 .512 .510 .408 .591 .776 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
MDPA1 20.7282 16.200 .712 .567 .889 
MDPA2 20.7670 15.808 .695 .537 .890 
MDPA3 21.2039 15.046 .669 .526 .894 
MDPA4 20.9029 15.343 .740 .657 .885 
MDPA5 21.1068 14.645 .807 .689 .876 
MDPA6 21.0194 15.706 .701 .667 .889 
MDPA7 21.0680 15.966 .674 .666 .892 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
24.4660 20.800 4.56074 7 
Scale: H3a 
VARIABLES=Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4, Q16_5, Q16_6, Q16_7 
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Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 104 99.0 
Excludeda 1 1.0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.915 .916 7 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
TEE1 3.3654 .97600 104 
TEE2 3.4808 .93457 104 
TEE3 3.4615 .96465 104 
TEE4 3.5096 .91371 104 
TEE5 3.2212 1.06084 104 
TEE6 3.1058 1.06048 104 
TEE7 3.0000 1.07937 104 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 TEE1 TEE2 TEE3 TEE4 TEE5 TEE6 TEE7 
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TEE1 1.000 .742 .747 .497 .587 .619 .608 
TEE2 .742 1.000 .807 .586 .675 .663 .654 
TEE3 .747 .807 1.000 .601 .649 .607 .504 
TEE4 .497 .586 .601 1.000 .454 .495 .473 
TEE5 .587 .675 .649 .454 1.000 .549 .678 
TEE6 .619 .663 .607 .495 .549 1.000 .585 
TEE7 .608 .654 .504 .473 .678 .585 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
TEE1 19.7788 24.057 .776 .654 .898 
TEE2 19.6635 23.779 .854 .758 .890 
TEE3 19.6827 23.966 .798 .752 .896 
TEE4 19.6346 25.885 .615 .416 .914 
TEE5 19.9231 23.761 .730 .593 .903 
TEE6 20.0385 23.940 .710 .513 .905 
TEE7 20.1442 23.795 .710 .605 .905 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
23.1442 32.435 5.69520 7 
Scale: H3b 
VARIABLES=Q17_2,Q17_3,Q17_4,Q17_5,Q17_6,Q17_7,Q17_8 
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Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 104 99.0 
Excludeda 1 1.0 
Total 105 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.812 .812 7 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
TEC8 3.1635 1.22364 104 
TEC2 3.3462 1.59957 104 
TEC3 3.4615 1.51320 104 
TEC4 3.2308 1.55314 104 
TEC5 3.3750 1.60211 104 
TEC6 3.1346 1.53318 104 
TEC7 3.1827 1.50575 104 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 TEC8 TEC8 TEC8 TEC8 TEC8 TEC8 TEC8 
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TEC8 1.000 .353 .163 .440 .350 .387 .352 
TEC2 .353 1.000 .531 .401 .301 .353 .385 
TEC3 .163 .531 1.000 .301 .388 .341 .282 
TEC4 .440 .401 .301 1.000 .308 .435 .492 
TEC5 .350 .301 .388 .308 1.000 .537 .358 
TEC6 .387 .353 .341 .435 .537 1.000 .570 
TEC7 .352 .385 .282 .492 .358 .570 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
TEC8 19.7308 43.208 .484 .295 .799 
TEC2 19.5481 38.852 .555 .393 .787 
TEC3 19.4327 40.850 .483 .358 .799 
TEC4 19.6635 39.080 .566 .365 .785 
TEC5 19.5192 39.223 .533 .358 .791 
TEC6 19.7596 38.029 .640 .477 .771 
TEC7 19.7115 39.120 .589 .415 .781 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
22.8942 52.484 7.24457 7 
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APPENDIX F: Interview Tool 
Alarm Analysis Assessment 
Tool© 
Facility Name/Address 
 
Unit #1 name / # beds  
Unit #2 name / # beds  
Unit #3 name / # beds  
Clinical Unit Manager  
Name / email / Telephone 
Alarm Committee 
member? 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
Safety / Regulatory  
Name / email / Telephone 
Alarm Committee 
member? 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
Vendor Contact – Nurse 
Call Name / email / 
Telephone Alarm 
Committee member? 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
Bio Med or Clinical 
Engineering (CE)  
Name / email / Telephone 
Alarm Committee 
member? 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
IT Applications / Database 
Name / email / Telephone 
Alarm Committee 
member? 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
Other contacts: 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
 
Patient Population 
Unit #1: 
Unit #2: 
Unit #3: 
 Q1.  Medical Devices Intake Form:  Medical devices alarming equipment and any known or 
historical malfunctions or noted problems 
 
Nurse Call: 
Vendor(s): 
Bed Model #:  
Software Version:  
Location of central station(s): 
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Alarm Parameters:  
Volume settings: 
Components / Accessories: 
Configuration of unit alarms for room calls (i.e. By wing, north/south, etc.): 
Types of alerting or alarming calls (by bed, by room): 
Bathroom emergency call: 
Bed status monitoring:  exit alert, bedrails, bed position, brakes, HOB, weight: 
Code Blue: 
Real-time status board? 
Staff locating enabled? 
Auto-disabling of safety alerts on caregiver presence? 
Patient safety reporting?  If “yes”, provide a 3-month historical report per unit, per patient, 
per staff assignment, per location: 
Is Nurse call system integrated into the EMR? 
Any known problems, historical malfunctions or noted issues? 
 
Middleware (if applicable): 
Vendor: 
Software Version:  
Location: 
Configuration: Date/Time, Room #, Patient Alarm, Latched/Unlatched Alarms, Silence, Pause, 
Modified, Disabled, Assigned Caregivers/Roles/Teams. 
Sample Algorithm(s): 
Any known problems, historical malfunctions or noted issues? 
 
End device: 
Phone (model number): 
Vocera: 
Pager(s): 
Vendor: 
Model #:  
Software Version:  
Location: 
Alarm Parameters:  
Volume settings: 
Any known problems, historical malfunctions or noted issues? 
Staff Assignment: 
Entered which system? 
Any known problems, historical malfunctions or noted issues? 
 
Central stations: 
Location: 
Staffing model: 
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Q2.  Alert/Alarm related policies and procedures Intake Form:  Provide all alarm-related 
policies and procedures. 
 
➢ Alert / alarm settings (patient or default?): 
 
➢ Alert / alarm silencing: 
 
➢ Alert / alarm limits: 
 
➢ Alert / alarm modification: 
 
➢ Alert / alarm disabling: 
 
➢ Downtime procedure: 
 
➢ Staff assignment: 
 
➢ Other: 
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Q3.  Review of alert/alarm workflow processes: 
 
➢ Is there a written workflow document specific to medical device alarms? 
 
➢ Who assigns patients?  Who delivers the information?  
 
➢ How is the information delivered?  
 
➢ Who is responsible for addressing the condition?  
 
➢ What is current back up when assigned staff are unavailable? 
 
➢ What happens when there are competing tasks? 
 
➢ Are the alerts / alarms audible? 
 
➢ What is the noise level of the unit? 
 
➢ Are there similar or competing alarms? 
 
➢ Is staff able to clearly identify the cause of most alarms? 
 
➢ Does alert / alarm silencing occur? 
 
➢ Are there barriers to audible or visual Alerts / Alarms 
 
Nurse call reports questions: 
   How often are the call reports reviewed? 
   Who reviews the nurse call reports? 
   Do the call reports affect nurse call assignment workflows? 
   Are the call reports ever viewed in “real-time”?  If yes, for what purpose? 
Comments: 
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Q4.  Alarm Log and Reporting 3-month historical review: 
➢ What is the average number of alarms per patient/per shift/per caregiver for the 3-
month time period? 
 
➢ Per alarm type (priority)  
 
➢ Per Patient / Unit  
 
➢ Response time  
 
Q5.  Alarm-related events Intake Form 
 
➢ Specific to the 3-month time of analysis, has there been any adverse, near misses or 
sentinel events related to clinical alarms? 
 
Additional comments:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
160 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
COLLEEN LINDELL, RN-BC, MHSA, CNOR, PHD(C)  
 
SUMMARY  
 
Versatile, healthcare professional with administrative, medical product (biologics, 
pharmaceuticals, medical device/combination devices/pharmaceuticals), informatics, medical 
research, trial, rural and urban clinical experience.  Experience in various medical therapeutic 
areas: Pain, Hematology, Gastro-enterology, GYN, Oncology, Surgery, Interventional Radiology, 
and Diabetes/Endocrinology. Enthusiastic, highly motivated, adaptable team player respected 
for resourcefulness, knowledge and collaborative style.   
 
EXPERIENCE  
 
3/17 - Present 
 
 
 
 
 
3/16 – 3/17  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
3/14 – 3/16  
  
Medical Science Liaison – Oncology     Tardis/Publicis/Novartis – Midwest USA 
• Serves as a clinical/scientific resource for Breast cancer related products 
and therapeutic area. 
• Successfully identifies appropriate clinical investigators and facilitates 
placement into Novartis-sponsored clinical trials.  
• Responds to healthcare professional medical information requests.  
 
Medical Science Liaison – Pain, Specialty Therapeutics, InventivHealth/Endo – Central USA  
• Serve as a clinical/scientific resource for products and therapeutic areas 
(internal and external customers).  
• Identify and build long-term relationships with thought leaders in 20 
Midwest states.  
• Share knowledge and participate in scientific exchanges with thought 
leaders.  
• Present clinical, scientific and economic product data and relevant 
therapeutic areas to formulary decision-makers.  
• Identify and communicate key clinical and research issues to appropriate 
internal partners to shape company research, development and 
commercial strategies.  
• Develop and implement business plans to support Medical Affairs strategic 
direction.  
  
Professional Technical Services Specialist, 3M Infection Prevention Division – MN  
• Provide internal/external clinical expertise for IPD devices in market 
development.  
161 
 
• Develop and present technical bulletins, customer letters, and education 
tools for internal and external customers.  
• Respond to requests for information and analyze quality complaints.  
• Collaborate, plan and conduct USA and Global customer clinical studies, 
including usability simulated evaluations.  
• Liaise as a clinical/technical expert with regulatory, legal, quality, 
marketing and lab personnel on a regular basis.  
 
 
9/11 - 3/14  
 
Medical Science Liaison, Oncology BTG International – North Central Region  
 
• Recipient - Most Valuable Person 2013 (Medical affairs team).   
• Provided interim management support for Western USA region (9 months).  
• Provided scientific support for marketed and development projects in loco-
regional therapies (drug eluting microspheres and 90Yttrium-microspheres in the 
Interventional Radiology space resulting in cross-fertilization of clinical, 
regulatory, pharmaceutical and scientific information for treatment of 
primary/secondary liver cancer.  
• Medical Science Liaison Lead for Pancreatic/Neuro-endocrine cancer.  
• Developed and maintained external expert partnerships at key medical 
institutions with key opinion leaders (MCW / UW / MN / IA / NE / IL / KUMC / 
NE / Wash U / SLU).  
• Responded to unsolicited requests for medical and scientific information and 
acted as a scientific resource for physicians leading their own clinical trial 
activities (IIS) as well as company sponsored trials (act as a CRA, - assist with 
patient enrollment).   
 
2/07-1/11 Senior Clinical Affairs Manager, Medical Science Liaison -Baxter USA 
•  Provided and maintained currency with TJC, FDA, GCP, scientific, and evidence-based 
information specific to Biosurgery’s Medication Delivery portfolio (drug/device).  
• Conducted risk assessment for new product development/marketed product 
• Developed, recruited and conducted internal and external design protocols and Simulation 
Laboratory studies with Human Factors in preparation for FDA submission.  
• Assisted with evaluation and selection of Clinical Research Organizations.  
• Identification, recruitment and development of KOLs in 6 Midwest states.  
• Acted as primary liaison to investigators who initiate clinical and non-clinical trial studies.  
• Project co-lead for Steep Rock (opinion leader electronic management system).  
• Reviewed, revised, and updated advertising / promotional product and scientific 
presentations.  
• Developed, presented and validated PowerPoint presentations for customers, colleagues & 
multi-disciplinary staff.  
• Participation in high-level training sessions, medical congress, clinical/scientific symposiums.  
• Corresponded with Bioscience team (medical affairs, sales, marketing, R & D) on local, 
national, and international levels to improve patient care & respond to customer needs.  
162 
 
2/05 – 2/07  Clinical Applications Specialist, Nurse Consultant, Hill Rom – Workflow Solutions – USA  
• Project management for nurse-call system (bed alerts, alarms, locating, 
reporting); Vocera (wireless communications system); and Navicare 
(scheduling/communication software system).  
• Provided education, implementation of integrated hospital systems.   
• On-site consultative services - mid / upper-level nursing and informatics 
executives.   
• Developed and presented recommendation proposals to customers and 
company.   
• Reviewed and provided consultative services regarding new system 
development.   
 
8/99 - Present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/96 – 8/99 
 
Registered Nurse, Charge Nurse, Regions Hospital (HealthPartners) - MN  
• Provide peri-operative nursing care to surgical patients (all specialties) 
Level 1 Trauma Center.  
• Act as Nursing Supervisor for peri-operative services. 
• Preceptor for new nursing RN employees.   
• Nursing professional recognition program recipient 2003 and 2004.   
• Communicate and coordinate patient care within multiple hospital 
departments.   
 
Clinical Coordinator, Nurse Consultant, Medwave, Magellan Medical Services - 
USA  
• Developed and provided national education programs for non-invasive 
arterial blood pressure monitoring system, IV pumps, and spinal implants.   
• Wrote Internal Review Board (IRB) applications and clinical research 
protocol.   
• Investigated, monitored, evaluated and assisted with publication of clinical 
research projects.   
• Ensured compliance with good clinical practice (GCP) guidelines.   
• Provided feedback to company regarding new product development. 
 
2/84 – 1/96  Director of Surgical Services, SDS Manager, Charge Nurse, RN, St. Croix Hospital – WI   
 
• Administrative responsibility for Operating Room, Central Sterile Processing, 
Post-anesthesia care, same day surgery and Pre-operative education / 
scheduling units.   
• Successfully prepared, educated and passed four JCAHO surveys.   
• Fiscal responsibility for $2.5 million-dollar budgets (multiple).  
• Founder West-central Wisconsin American association of diabetes educators 
(WCWAADE).   
• Developed, submitted, and achieved American Diabetes Education national 
program recognition.  
163 
 
• Evaluated equipment, negotiated and purchased O.R. supplies and capital 
equipment.   
• Developed HR through orientation and development program, training, and 
staffing.   
• Led and sponsored multiple quality improvement projects (scheduling, 
staffing, program).   
EDUCATION  
 
2017  PhD(c) Biomedical & Health Informatics, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee  
2008  Master’s in Health Services Administration, Saint Joseph’s College - ME  
2000  BS in Health Services Administration, Saint Joseph’s College - ME  
1984  Associate Degree, Nursing   Saint Mary’s College - MN 
CONTINUING EDUCATION  
 
  21 CFR training by CDRH, Simulation in Healthcare 2009 (22 CEU’s), Human Factors 
consideration in Designing Medical Device trials conference, Statistics, Epidemiology 
and Surveillance Training Modules 1-4 (Baxter Healthcare), Microsoft Project 
Methods for the PMM (1.5 days training course) and attendance at annual AORN, 
Pain Management and HIMSS conferences.   
CERTIFICATIONS  
 
  Current: Operating Room Nursing (CNOR), Advanced Coronary Life Support (ACLS), Pediatric  
Advanced Life Support (PALS), Pain Management 
Past: Nursing Administration, Diabetes Educator   
LICENSURE  
 
  Registered Nurse Licensure: WI #89477 (multi-state) - Current and unrestricted   
 
 
164 
 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS  
 
 Association of Operating Room Nurses – Member since 1987, book reviewer, Perioperative 
Resource Network, Volunteer Consultant.  President East Metro MN Chapter, 2006 – 2008, Past 
President 200-2010, Simulation Task Force member 2014-2015.   
American Society for Pain Management Nursing - Member   
American Society of PeriAnesthesia Nurses – Member   
American Nurses Association – Affiliate member   
AMIA – Member (student)   
AAMI / Medical Device Alarms – Committee member  
AAMI / Multifunction monitor committee – Committee member  
HIMSS (Health Informatics) – Member   
IEEE – Graduate Student Member   
IV Nurses Society (INS) - Member   
Minnesota State Council – Peri-Op Nursing – Member   
Society for Simulation in Healthcare – Member   
WCWAADE - Founder of West-central Wisconsin American association of diabetes educators. 1995   
 
PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS  
 
Medical Device Alarm Trepidations.  3M Healthcare Academy.  Live webinar.  March 2015.  
Perioperative Clinical Simulations Poster Presentation “Difficulty Airway” - Proposal ID: 4591. 
AORN Annual Meeting.  Denver CO 2015.   
Transcultural Analysis of Medical Device Alarm Trepidations Poster Presentation.   UW–Milwaukee 2nd 
Annual Informatics Symposium.  Milwaukee, WI.  2015. 
165 
 
24th Summer Institute of Nursing Informatics, University of Maryland - School of Nursing, 2014.  
Community of Practice Presentation: Annual Risk File Review for Devices.  Baxter Medication Delivery 
2010.   
Global Infusion Systems Clinical Library:  Current Status, Right-sphere, and Future Status.  Baxter 
Healthcare 2010.   
Medical Device Alarms.  Baxter Healthcare Global Infusion Systems Division. IL 2010.   
Understanding the differences: Hemostats, Sealants and Adhesives.  MW USA Hospitals 2007.  
Online Medical/Nursing Informatics.  RNMarket, Tampa, FL.  Feb. 2006.  
Successful expert testimony. National Nurses in Business. Chicago, IL. June 2005.   
OR Mock Trial.  East Metro AORN.  Minneapolis, MN.  May 2005.  Abbott NW 2006.     
Internet Medical Research Poster Presentation. Professional Nursing Education Group. Atlanta, GA. 
2004.     
MediPro Seminars.  New Orleans, LA. 2004.   
Searching the Internet Successfully.  National Nurses in Business, Chicago, IL.  2003.   
Internet research for the healthcare professional.  NursingMatters/WI ed. 2003.   
Documentation Issues & Charting for the future in Minnesota.  Lorman Ed., 2002.   
Independent Legal Nurse Consulting. NNBA Annual Meeting.  Las Vegas, NV. 2002.   
Win with the Aces – Online research/resources for Standards of Care - NMLCI. Las Vegas, NV. March 
2002.   
Medical Internet Database Searching: Getting Results! Regions Hospital, St. Paul, MN.  2002.   
Searching the Internet for Quality Medical information – Regions Hospital, St. Paul, MN.  2001.   
Internet Medical/Health Information Poster Presenter – MLA Annual Meeting – Chicago, IL. 1999.   
Non-invasive Arterial Blood Pressure Monitoring – ASAT – Orlando, FL.  1998.   
Developing Ambulatory Recovery Pathways – AHA’s Society for Ambulatory Professionals – New 
Orleans, LA.  1993.   
Surgery Scheduling - Rural Nurse Managers – New Richmond, WI. 1992. Diabetes: Forming Support 
Groups.     
166 
 
Managing Diabetes, Updates, Pathophysiology, Hyperglycemia, Hypoglycemia – Ambulance Rescue & 
Community Groups – WI.  1990-1995.   
  
PUBLICATIONS & ASSIGNMENTS  
AAMI TIRR66: 2017 Guidance for the creation of physiologic data and waveform databases to 
demonstrate reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of alarm system algorithms.  AAMI 
alarm committee representative. 
Moderator, ASPMN Annual Meeting 2016.  Louisville, KY.   
Simulation Task Force Member appointment.  AORN.  2014-2015.  
Adjunct Instructor 2011.  Medical Literature Research Module.  University of Florida Legal Nurse 
Consulting Online Pre-Certificate Program.      
AMIA-0483-A2011 – Poster, EMR Practicum University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.   Eric Dohman, Colleen 
Lindell, Natalie Rahmin, Timothy B. Patrick, PhD.    
57th Annual AORN Congress Session Assistant.  2010.  Denver, CO.    
Peri-operative Resource Network member 2004-2009.  AORN. Denver, CO.   
Annual 2007 HIMSS Conference Presentation Reviewer.  2006.    
Competency & Credentialing Institute.  CNOR Item/Test Form Review Committee CCI Champion. 2006-
2007.    
Standards of Care research - author.  LNCRESOURCE national newsletter.  2004 - 2006.   
Council Peri-operative Board Nursing (CPBN)-Certification exam reviewer.  2004.    
Council Peri-operative Board Nursing (CPBN)–Certification exam writer.  2002.    
National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCLEX) – Item writer.  2002.    
Expert Panel/Best Practices –panel member. MLCI Journal.  2002–Present.   
How to get great search results on the Internet-author.  IMPRINT. Vol. 48, No. 3. May 2001.    
Legal Tips Weekly- author – Health Resources Unlimited http://www.hru.net, 2000.    
Four steps to Better Search Results on the Internet-author   NursingSpectrum.com.  2000.    
Malpractice:  A step-by-step guide to understanding the process- author.  Nurses.com. 1999.    
167 
 
Internet Medical & Health, Searching & Sources Guidebook/CD – KC Press 1998 - 2004.   Searching the 
Internet for Medical & Health Information – CEU Module - Pacific West Health Education. 1999.    
Book reviewer.  AORN Journal 1997 - 2004. Standards reviewer. AORN.  2003 – 2004.    
Reviewer, Medical Reference Services Quarterly Haworth Information Press. 1999.    
Work Redesign in the Peri-operative setting – AORN Management Specialty Publications, 1996. 
Ambulatory Recovery Pathways-author – Society for Ambulatory Care Professionals of the AHA journal, 
1994.    
Volunteer, Camp Nurse, Diabetes Educator & Speaker, CQI Team Leader, Diabetes Advisory  
Committee Facilitator, Wellness Committee member, Nursing Executive Committee member, 
Orthopedic Task Force Committee member, and Surgical Services/Tissue Review Committee Co-Chair, 
and Founder WI Diabetes Educator Association.   Diabetes Ed. 1987 - 1996.    
Sunday School Teacher / Assistant.  
